

JPRS-TAC-92-007
3 MARCH 1992



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT 3

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Arms Control

19980113 075

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-007

CONTENTS

3 March 1992

CHINA

Bush Address to UN Security Council Reported [XINHUA 31 Jan]	1
Spokesman Comments on Bush, Yeltsin Initiatives [CHINA DAILY 31 Jan]	1
'News Analysis' Assesses Bush-Yeltsin Talks [XINHUA 3 Feb]	1
DPRK Approves Denuclearization Declaration [XINHUA 5 Feb]	2
Baker Reported To Urge START Ratification [XINHUA 6 Feb]	2

EAST ASIA

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Commander's Remarks on N-Weapons Criticized [KCNA 31 Jan]	3
--	---

SOUTH KOREA

Government Welcomes U.S., Russian Nuclear Cuts [YONHAP 31 Jan]	3
--	---

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

ISREAL

U.S. Pressure on 'Nuclear Issue' Discounted [HA'ARETZ 24 Jan]	4
---	---

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

RESPONSE TO BUSH, YELTSIN INITIATIVES

Western Reactions to Proposed Arms Cuts Viewed [IZVESTIYA 31 Jan]	5
Pentagon 'Restraint' on Initiatives Viewed [TRUD 31 Jan]	5
Further Reaction to Yeltsin, Bush Initiatives	6
Shevardnadze Welcomes Initiatives [INTERFAX 31 Jan]	6
Japan Appreciates Proposal [TASS 31 Jan]	6
Desire To 'Accelerate' Disarmament Seen [V. Ovchinnikov; PRAVDA 31 Jan]	6
Bush State of the Union Assessed [S. Demidov; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 31 Jan]	8
Differences Between Packages Outlined [V. Kuklev; Moscow Radio 31 Jan]	8
Georgiy Arbatov on Defense Doctrine [Moscow TV 2 Feb]	9
Kazakh President Welcomes Yeltsin Statement [Alma-Ata Radio 31 Jan]	9
'Reliability' of Yeltsin's Program Viewed [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 1 Feb]	10
Yeltsin Initiatives Said To Benefit 'Universal Security' [Moscow Radio 3 Feb]	11
U.S., World Response to Yeltsin Proposals Weighed [PRAVDA 3 Feb]	11
Bush, Cheney Cited on Talks With Yeltsin [TASS 3 Feb]	12
Yeltsin Tour Said To Mirror Gorbachev Approach [PRAVDA 3 Feb]	13
Yeltsin Initiative Described as 'Promising, Extraordinary' [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Feb]	15

GENERAL

Prospects for Joint EC 'Nuclear Button' Viewed [IZVESTIYA 15 Jan]	15
Military 'Adviser' on Republic Ties, Arms Issues [Milan L'UNITA 26 Jan]	16
Text of Yeltsin Letter to UN Secretary General [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 31 Jan]	16
ICBM 'Retargeting' Seen Increasing Tensions [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 1 Feb]	20
Major, Yeltsin Comment on Yeltsin Talks in London [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 1 Feb]	21
Yeltsin Speech to UN Security Council [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Feb]	21

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Commentary Notes SDI Technology Transfers [Radio Rossii 1 Feb]	22
Need, Prospects for Cooperation With U.S. in Global Defense Viewed [Y. Shaposhnikov; TASS 1 Feb]	23
Yeltsin Comments on Arms Initiatives During U.S. Trip	23
New York Press Conference [Moscow TV 1 Feb]	23
Questioned on Global Defense Proposal [TASS 1 Feb]	24
Says Bush Finds Proposal 'Tempting' [TASS 2 Feb]	24
Academics Comment on Yeltsin Global Defense Proposal	25
Early Warning Cooperation Seen [A. Kokoshin; INTERFAX 4 Feb]	25
Russia Not 'Poor Relative' [Ye. Velikhov; TASS 4 Feb]	25

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Russia To Negotiate With Baltics on CIS Forces Withdrawal	25
Russian Decree on Forces Jurisdiction [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 1 Feb]	25
Withdrawal 'Now Under Control' [TASS 2 Feb]	26
Withdrawal To Begin Feb, Mar [INTERFAX 2 Feb]	26
Admiral Kapitanets on Talks [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Feb]	26
Deputy Premier Shakhrai News Conference [Russian TV 4 Feb]	27
Troops Withdrawal Timetable Given [TASS 4 Feb]	27
NWGF Commander To Represent Russia [Tallinn Radio 4 Feb]	27
Experts To Meet To Start Drafting Treaty [BALTFAX 5 Feb]	28
Russian-Lithuanian Talks on Troop Withdrawal	28
Communique Issued [TASS 1 Feb]	28
Delegation Leaders Comment [Vilnius Radio 1 Feb]	29
Latvia, Russia Issue Communique on Troop Talks [Riga Radio 2 Feb]	30
Russian-Estonian Troop Withdrawal Negotiations Begin	31
Initial Information Given [Moscow Radio 2 Feb]	31
Army Property Claimed [BALTFAX 2 Feb]	31
Consensus Reached [TASS 2 Feb]	32
Russian Delegation Arrives in Bonn for Troop Talks [TASS 3 Feb]	32
CFE Treaty Agenda Based on CIS Emergence [TASS 5 Feb]	32

NUCLEAR TESTING

Details on Semipalatinsk Test Range Disclosed [TASS 4 Feb]	33
Arms Experts on 'Cracked' Nuclear Shield [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 4 Feb]	33

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Commentary on Problems in CW Elimination [Moscow Radio 28 Jan]	34
CW Commander Cited on Problems in Weapons Elimination [TASS 3 Feb]	35
BW 'Still Being Tested' in Aral Sea Area [POSTFACTUM 6 Feb]	35

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

CIS Agreement on Nuclear Forces 'Reassuring' [Russian TV 28 Jan]	36
Tactical Nuclear Arms Withdrawing From Kiev District [NARODNAYA ARMIYA 28 Jan]	36
Yeltsin ABC Interview Cited on Nuclear Command, Control [TASS 1 Feb]	37
Kazakh President: 'Yeltsin Speaks Not on Our Behalf' [TASS 6 Feb]	37
Tactical Nuclear Arms Withdrawal From Belarus Not Complete [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 8 Feb]	38

WEST EUROPE

AUSTRIA

Vranitzky Suggests West Buy CIS Weapons [Vienna TV 4 Feb]	39
---	----

FRANCE

European Defense Identity, Doctrine Discussed	[<i>LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS 11-12 Jan</i>]	39
Mitterrand, Yeltsin Discuss Nuclear Disarmament	[<i>AFP 5 Feb</i>]	39

GERMANY

Defense Minister on New Bundeswehr Missions, Policy	[<i>SOLDAT UND TECHNIK Jan</i>]	40
Kohl Favors Linking CIS Aid to Arms Control	[<i>DPA 6 Feb</i>]	44

SWEDEN

Prime Minister Seeks Role in 'Global Defenses in Space'	[<i>SVENSKA DAGBLADET 4 Feb</i>]	44
---	------------------------------------	----

Bush Address to UN Security Council Reported

OW3101213692 Beijing XINHUA in English
2045 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Text] United Nations, January 31 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush today appealed to all nations for the elimination of chemical weapons.

"Let us vow to make this year the year all nations at long last join to ban this scourge," Bush told the Security Council summit this morning.

He pledged that the United States is prepared to move forward on mutual arms reduction and welcomed the statements made by several former Soviet republics that they would abide by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

However, he said that the danger of proliferation remains and that countries must act together so that from this time forward, people involved in sophisticated weapons programs redirect their energies to peaceful endeavors.

Referring to the United Nations, Bush called for internal reforms and revitalization of the 166-member world organization and asked various countries to "accept the responsibilities necessary for a vigorous and effective united nations."

He noted that right now across the globe, the United Nations is working night and day in the cause of peace. "Never before in its four decades has the U.N.'s blue helmets and blue berets been so engaged in the noble work of peace-keeping."

He added that never before has the United Nations been so ready and so compelled to step up to the task of peace-making, both to resolve hot wars and to conduct that forward-looking mission known as preventive diplomacy.

However, the United States is the biggest debtor to the United Nations, with more than 266 million U.S. dollars in unpaid contributions to the U.N. regular budget and 140.9 million to the peace-keeping funds at the end of last year, thus contributing to the worsening U.N. fund crisis and affecting its efficiency.

Former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar described as "a great irony" the fact that "the United Nations is on the brink of insolvency at the very time the world community has entrusted the organization with new and unprecedented responsibilities."

Bush declared that he looked to the secretary-general to present to the Security Council his recommendations to ensure effective and efficient peace-keeping, peace-making and preventive diplomacy.

Spokesman Comments on Bush, Yeltsin Initiatives

HK3101002192 Beijing CHINA DAILY in English
31 Jan 92 p 1

[By staff reporter Zhang Ping: "State Lauds Disarming Proposals"]

[Text] China yesterday welcomed the nuclear disarmament plans separately announced by U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman told a weekly news briefing in Beijing that China has taken note of the nuclear arsenal cuts plans and hopes the United States and the Russian Federation "will, as soon as possible, implement and complete these plans."

The spokesman, Duan Jin, said China stands for a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Its position on disarmament is that the two countries "that possess the largest number of and most advanced nuclear weapons should shoulder special responsibility and obligations in reaching this goal," the spokesman said.

Duan pointed out that China has always opposed the arms race in outer space and stands for the prohibition of any such weapons.

Duan said China possesses only a very small number of nuclear weapons, and they are entirely for self-defence purposes.

"And when these two countries stop testing, producing and deploying nuclear weapons and cut their nuclear arsenal to China's level, China will naturally take part in the process of nuclear disarmament ..." the spokesman said.

China has already taken positive steps to cut its conventional weapons, he added.

Commenting on the fourth summit meeting of Asean, Duan said the policies adopted at the meeting will exert a positive and far-reaching influence on strengthening political and economic relations and promoting regional co-operation among Asean countries.

China believes that with the joint efforts of its member states, Asean will grow even more dynamic and play a more important role in the Asia-Pacific region and in international affairs.

Also at the briefing, Duan said Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji will visit Australia and New Zealand next month.

'News Analysis' Assesses Bush-Yeltsin Talks

OW0302074192 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0432 GMT 3 Feb 91

["News Analysis" by XINHUA reporter Huang Yong (7806 0516): "A Look at U.S.-Russian Relations Through Meeting Between Bush and Yeltsin"—XINHUA headline]

[Excerpt] Washington, 1 Feb (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin met for three hours today at Camp David to discuss the situation in the former Soviet Union, nuclear disarmament, Russia's economic reform, and bilateral cooperation.

Public opinion here has maintained that the United States wanted to use the meeting to gain a better understanding of both Russia and Yeltsin in terms of their current status and long-term goals. Russia, meanwhile, wanted to take the opportunity to demonstrate its position in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the world, as well as to get a better idea of the extent the United States would support it. This was the first meeting between U.S. and Russian leaders since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and each side tried to figure out the other side's intentions.

In a statement issued at the end of the meeting, both sides claimed that the two countries had already become "partners" with identical values and no longer viewed each other as a "potential enemy," emphasizing extensive "cooperation" in the future. Judging from information revealed after the meeting, however, both sides are not in agreement on a number of major issues and are keeping a wary eye on one another.

First, there is still considerable disagreement on the issue of nuclear disarmament. On 28 January, Bush put forward a proposal on nuclear disarmament in his State of the Union address. Bush indicated in his proposal that, if all land-based multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM] in the former Soviet Union were destroyed, the United States would take matching steps, including the destruction of MX missiles and a one-fifth reduction in warheads on submarine-launched ICBM's. The next day, Yeltsin presented his disarmament proposal, calling for sharper reductions of nuclear arms by both sides, with each cutting strategic nuclear warheads down to 2,000-2,500 units. He also suggested that the United States and Russia join hands to develop a "global defense system" to replace the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative." American public opinion holds that Bush and Yeltsin both have their own motives. The United States wants to neutralize the former Soviet Union's advantage in land-based multi-warhead ICBM's, while Yeltsin wants to "gain advantages by making concessions" in order to maintain a balance in strategic arms between the two countries. [passage omitted]

DPRK Approves Denuclearization Declaration

OW0502082392 Beijing XINHUA in English
0734 GMT 5 Feb 92

[Text] Pyongyang, February 5 (XINHUA)—The joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was approved by the legislative machinery of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea here Wednesday.

The Central People's Committee and the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly gave the approval at a joint meeting, says the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY. The declaration was adopted on January 20.

A report on the joint meeting says the declaration accords with the desire of the whole Korean nation to have nuclear weapons withdrawn from the peninsula, to remove the nuclear threat to the people and to denuclearize the country, and also with the aspirations of all peace-loving people to build a new world free from the threat of a nuclear war.

The report further says the meeting assessed the declaration as a historical document of epochal significance in removing the nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula, creating favorable conditions for peace and the peaceful reunification of the country, and contributing to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.

The meeting laid emphasis on the need for North and South to take comprehensive steps to faithfully implement the declaration.

It urged nuclear weapon states to give a legal guarantee to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, and said neighboring countries must respect the joint declaration and support the denuclearization.

Baker Reported To Urge START Ratification

OW0602062892 Beijing XINHUA in English
0229 GMT 6 Feb 92

[Excerpts] Washington, February 5 (XINHUA)—United States Secretary of State James Baker acknowledged today that U.S. emergency food aid is too slow in getting to the people of the former Soviet Union.

Before a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Baker said "we recognize there is a need to accelerate deliveries of food and medicine." [passage omitted]

At the same time, Baker urged the Senate to ratify the START treaty, saying it took ten years to conclude and should be "locked in" even as he holds talks in Moscow on February 15-16 on Bush's proposal for a ceiling of 4,700 nuclear warheads and Yeltsin's call for dropping the total to about 2,500.

The START treaty would leave the United States with some 8,000 to 9,000 warheads and four nuclear republics—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan—with about 1,000 fewer.

"Until you have an agreement you don't have anything to ratify," Baker said of the Bush-Yeltsin exchange of proposals.

Senator Joseph Biden said unless an arms control pact with the former Soviet Union is quickly updated, the Pentagon would find ways to retain nuclear warheads to defend the United States.

"There are lots of guys in the basement of the Pentagon looking for new targets for these weapons," Senator Biden said.

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Commander's Remarks on N-Weapons Criticized

*SK3101113892 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0959 GMT 31 Jan 92*

[Text] Pyongyang January 31 (KCNA)—RisCassi, commander of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces occupying South Korea, told "KOREA TIMES" on January 27 that he "advised" the South Korean authorities not to hasten too much the solution of the "question of North Korea's nuclear weapons development programme" and South Korea would remain under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella", according to a report from Seoul.

As for the instructions given by RisCassi to the South Korean puppets over the "question of the DPRK's nuclear weapons development programme", it is a ruse to keep the U.S. imperialists' occupation policy in South Korea from falling to pieces.

It has become clear that when the inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency is carried out, the fiction of the DPRK's "development of nuclear weapons" over which the United States has shouted itself hoarse will be brought into a glaring light and the United States will be left with no ground whatsoever to station its troops in South Korea any longer.

The United States, perplexed by this, let the commander of the occupation forces give an order to the puppets "not to make haste" in raising the "nuclear development problem" in an attempt to gain time to invent a new pretext to justify its policy of occupation.

By continued protection of South Korea with "nuclear umbrella" the United States means that it will go on to threaten our Republic with nukes, ignoring the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula" agreed upon and adopted by the North and the South and that it will continue to harass peace on the Korean peninsula and in Asia and the rest of the world.

The utterances of RisCassi that the role of the "U.N. Forces Command" will not change in South Korea betrayed the criminal intention of the United States not to implement the resolution of the 30th U.N. General Assembly but to use the United Nations as a tool for its aggression, going against the trend of the times. Facts show that the U.S. ruling quarters did not mean what they said in welcoming the adoption of "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula" and "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South" and they are desperately trying to bar their implementation.

SOUTH KOREA

Government Welcomes U.S., Russian Nuclear Cuts

*SK3101041992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0357 GMT
31 Jan 92*

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 31 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea welcomed Friday nuclear arms reduction announcements by the United States and Russia and called on North Korea to follow suit.

"We welcome U.S. President George Bush's nuclear weapons cut proposal in his State of the Union address Jan. 28 and Russian President Boris Yeltsin's sweeping series of nuclear arms cuts," Foreign Ministry Spokesman Cho Won-il said in a statement.

"We expect that these measures by the United States and Russia will greatly diminish the dangers and fears of nuclear war and contribute to peace not only on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia but in the world.

"We hope that other nuclear countries will follow in these actions," Cho said.

He urged North Korea to follow the trend and take steps to ratify and implement in the shortest period possible the nuclear safeguards accord it signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Thursday in Vienna.

ISREAL

U.S. Pressure on 'Nuclear Issue' Discounted

92AE0196Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jan 92
p B1

Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Compromise and Deterrent"]

[Text] In a few days time, when the multilateral conference opens in Moscow to discuss, among other things, arms control issues, we can certainly expect an avalanche of threatening headlines to the effect that the United States and other countries are trying to twist Israel's arm about the nuclear weapons they think it has. This kind of nervousness became noticeable a few weeks ago and the impression it created was that President Bush had instructed his representatives to burst into Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona and to treat Israel as if it were Iraq. Which is exactly what the Arabs want.

I recommend to the readers and political factors in Israel not to get carried away by such headlines. That is not the intention of the United States and obviously that is not the prevailing situation. I am convinced that I am not taking any gamble with this estimate. Washington's approach to the arms control issue is extremely careful. Its intention is to defuse the intricate mines very patiently and not to be swept away by the Arabs in this matter.

Just as the U.S. negotiators are currently not considering forcing Israel to discuss the establishment of a Palestinian state, the right of return, or the division of Jerusalem, it is equally clear to them that dealing with the particulars of the nuclear issue will have to wait for later stages.

At present Israel has no reason to feel to nervous, provided it prepares thoroughly for future talks on nuclear issues, missiles, and unconventional weapons in the Middle East in general.

If I were an Arab, I would keep in mind what U.S. experts have undoubtedly known for a long time: There is no way that Israel will agree to territorial concessions and in a parallel manner, at the same time, to relinquishing the nuclear weapons that the Arabs claim it has. There is also no way that Israel will agree to give up its territorial security zone under a political settlement while at the same time weakening its deterrent capability. The logical formula calls for the reverse situation: Because Israel will come to a territorial compromise, it will have to take far greater care to develop another deterrent capability. Weakening in one area demands a greater deterrent in another area.

If there is any chance to handle both these issues together, it will be after a generation of peace and mutual trust. If I were a Palestinian, for example, I would assign high priority to the territorial compromise, in order to

achieve peace and to end the conflict, and I would refrain from challenging Israel's own security. Should the Arabs try to achieve both goals at the same time, in the end they will achieve neither.

A careful examination of President Bush's proposal (published last May) for monitoring the arms race in the Middle East will reveal this kind of careful approach. Regarding the nuclear issue, for example, it did not call for disarming. The proposal was to stop producing and acquiring nuclear fission materiel. In other words, to freeze the present situation and not to make it worse. In time the sides will have to sign a charter against nuclear arms proliferation. Discussions with Americans designed to find out what their timetable is for the next stage and for signing such a charter show that they are thinking in terms of more than a few years.

Immediately after the Moscow conference we will have the verification for this estimate. The bombastic speeches will be followed by a period of calm in which the sides will undertake tiny steps toward arms control and regional security agreements. Under American and Russian guidance, the sides will turn to what is known as "Sunday topics" in arms control. The United States and Russia have dozens of years of experience, both good and bad, in this respect.

The approach to Israel and the Arabs in the area of arms control will be almost educational. They will begin by trying to establish an agenda divided into immediate and more distant stages. The Americans will suggest establishing working teams of experts in the areas of conventional and nonconventional weapons, and missiles. The work will focus on genuine confidence-building steps. For example, the sides will be requested to define the threats to each and ways of reducing them. There will be discussions on means by which the sides will be able to report military exercises and troop concentrations to each other, with a view to preventing military misunderstandings. There will be suggestions to establish "hot lines" between general or regional headquarters on the two sides of the border, and perhaps a crisis-management center designed to prevent incidents from escalating. There will probably be talks on halting missile launch tests and on the sides' participation, at the side of the major arms suppliers, in entering arms deals into the UN Middle East armaments book.

From a military viewpoint, the goal of the early stages must be to reduce more markedly the chance of one side staging a surprise attack against the other. For that purpose they will have to find a means of increasing the two sides' deterrent space, so that they will feel more reassured while conducting political negotiations. If such a target is attained in the coming two years, it will be a significant achievement. Only at a later stage will the sides come to essential discussions, rather than dispensing slogans, about weighty issues such as nuclear and unconventional weapons.

RESPONSE TO BUSH, YELTSIN INITIATIVES

Western Reactions to Proposed Arms Cuts Viewed

PM0302143392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Aleksandr Sychev article: "Example of Striking Collaboration and Cooperation: That Is How the West Views the Russian and U.S. Disarmament Initiatives"]

[Text] The nuclear era entered a new phase when the U.S. and Russian presidents announced their intention to make significant reductions to their arsenals.

FRG Chancellor Kohl assessed the initiatives put forward by the two nuclear powers as a sign that "security policy is acquiring a new quality." British Prime Minister Major has expressed the view that the proposed measures are a "further step toward reducing the nuclear competition between the superpowers."

NATO Secretary General Woerner is sure that the world will become freer and safer as a result of implementing the planned reductions. In his opinion, special attention should be paid to the idea of the Russian President, who urged the United States to create a global defense system against nuclear weapons to replace America's "strategic defense initiative."

Foreign experts note that the Washington and Moscow initiatives follow parallel courses and have much in common, which, in the opinion of P. Beaver, publisher of JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, the well-known British military political publication, is "an example of striking collaboration and cooperation."

THE WASHINGTON POST stresses in an analytical article that this is primarily a question of changing the structure of the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. The most modern, dangerous, and destabilizing weapons—MIRVed missiles—are to be destroyed. This type of weapon is considered the most provocative in conditions of nuclear confrontation because it is the most attractive target for a preemptive strike.

Bush's initiative is aimed at balancing the positions because it includes the reduction of over 1,150 U.S. sea-launched warheads, something which is not being demanded of Moscow, THE WASHINGTON POST goes on. At the same time, other experts have expressed definite concern at the fact that the Russian proposals are larger in scale than the American. For example, the United States, according to rough estimates, is going to reduce 2,000 warheads whereas Russia will reduce around 5,000. "Washington needs to take steps in response to ensure equilibrium," K. Gasteiger, a Swiss disarmament expert, has said.

While giving a high assessment of the disarmament race between the United States and Russia, Britain and France have nevertheless not responded to the Russian President's appeal to join in this process. "The world has entered the nuclear era but has not yet come close to its

end," J. Mellick, French Defense Ministry spokesman, stated, and consequently France's arms will be retained.

There was an unexpectedly critical comment from London on Washington's intention to reduce the number of warheads on sea-launched missiles. "We think," a politician who wished to remain anonymous said, "that this is an unwise step." The fact is that London is planning to begin building its fourth Trident submarine whose ballistic missiles the Royal Navy is going to buy in the United States. If their production across the ocean is going to be reduced, Britain fears that its nuclear forces will inadvertently be drawn into the disarmament process.

Pentagon 'Restraint' on Initiatives Viewed

924P0062A Moscow TRUD in Russian
31 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by TRUD correspondent V. Sisnev: "'Restraint' Remains: But Now the United States Will Have Other Enemies"]

[Text] Washington—There is a strict demarcation for the American military—there are questions within their jurisdiction; beyond this line politics begins, and here they must not involve themselves. It is in this spirit that a colonel in the Department of Defense answered me yesterday, when I asked whether the words spoken by his secretary of defense meant that the doctrine of "restraint" remains in force.

The Pentagon briefing followed on the heels of statements by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin concerning their planned reductions of nuclear and other arms. Cheney and new CIA Director Gates stated earlier that the United States and former USSR have ceased to be opposing powers, enabling a reevaluation to be conducted of the structure and strength of the American Armed Forces. Here Bush proposed (not without glancing towards the upcoming elections, of course) in his annual address a specific plan for reducing military expenditures by 50 billion over a five-year period.

Although Cheney used numerous chart diagrams at his briefing, these were intended to show the political significance of what was happening in its entirety. The secretary left specific data on the services and branches up to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, who would speak after him.

Many times in recent decades dangerous situations have emerged, unforeseen by anyone in the United States. It turned out possible to repulse a threat only because, in following the doctrine of "restraint of a potential enemy," the country was prepared for any unexpected event. It was impossible to predict the disintegration of the USSR, and it would be just as impossible to predict the future development of the world. In other words, U.S. military presence in all strategically significant regions of the globe, the secretary concluded, must be preserved. That is the first point. Second, thanks to the now radically different relations existing between the United States and Commonwealth of Independent

States, global policies could be carried out more profitably from the point of view of the American taxpayer.

But perhaps most curious of all in this programmed speech of the defense secretary was the fact that, unlike all previous presentations, this one did not imply that we were among those whom America would have to "restrain." Cheney just simply did not define whom he had in mind. He discoursed on hypothetical situations which could arise in one region or another, as occurred for example in the Persian Gulf.

Listening to him and then to General Powell, I thought about the fact that just a few years ago my pen would automatically have put something down on paper about "the American military in the role of world policeman." I also thought about how good it was that today we can objectively discuss how our and American missiles of all shapes and sizes will disappear gradually from our arsenals, and those that remain will not be aimed at Washington or Moscow.

I bear no grudge against that Pentagon colonel. On the contrary, I believe this is the way it must be—military matters for the military, and politics for the politicians.

Further Reaction to Yeltsin, Bush Initiatives

Shevardnadze Welcomes Initiatives

*OW3101165292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1613 GMT 31 Jan 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Former Soviet Foreign Minister, Co-Chairman of the Democratic Reform Movement Eduard Shevardnadze has welcomed the Russian and U.S. presidents' initiatives on arms cuts. In a statement Shevardnadze stresses that Yeltsin and Bush have proposed plans of resolute actions aimed at further reducing the nuclear threat and promoting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Shevardnadze is convinced that these measures would be a major contribution toward greater strategic stability and international security.

Shevardnadze believes it is essential that other states, in the first place those producing nuclear weapons, make commitments on nuclear and conventional arms similar to those made by Russia.

Japan Appreciates Proposal

*LD3101223792 Moscow TASS in English 2058 GMT
31 Jan 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo January 31 TASS—The Japanese Government appreciates a very important speech that Russian President Boris Yeltsin delivered on January 29. It was assessed in Japan as an evidence of Russia's positive approach to a broad range of measures in nuclear disarmament and other kinds of disarmament. Deputy Press

Secretary of the Japanese Foreign Ministry Sadaaki Numata told a briefing for foreign reporters here on Tuesday [28 January].

He said the Japanese Foreign Ministry strongly hopes that Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States will be ensuring centralized and strict control over nuclear arms and related technologies and will be fulfilling their obligations in the area of arms control and disarmament.

Numata said Tokyo hopes that the initiatives made by U.S. President George Bush and by Boris Yeltsin will undoubtedly help strengthen global effort in the area of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and thus help contribute to ensuring peace, security and stability in the world.

Observers noted a statement of Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe, reflecting the Japanese Government's response to George Bush's proposals. Watanabe said Japan strongly supports this as a courageous measure for nuclear disarmament.

The response of the Japanese Government to the Russian initiatives was more restrained. Asked by ITAR-TASS why the Japanese Government preferred not to publish any official statements this time, Numata said that during a meeting in New York on Friday [31 January], Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa will have an opportunity to state directly his positive appraisal of President Yeltsin's initiatives.

The Japanese spokesman rejected inventions that Tokyo's relatively restrained reaction could be a way of expressing Tokyo's displeasure that Yeltsin could not have had a meeting with Michio Watanabe in Moscow on January 27. He said that nothing of the kind was intended. Prime Minister Miyazawa is very much interested to hear President Yeltsin setting out Russia's intentions, he said.

Sources in the Japanese Foreign Ministry told ITAR-TASS that Bush's and Yeltsin's proposals should be studied in greater detail. It should be noted, specifically, that Russia places greater emphasis on the need for the reduction of sea-launched cruise missiles, and the United States on the need to reduce land-based missiles.

Desire To 'Accelerate' Disarmament Seen

*PM3101172792 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
31 Jan 92 pp 1, 5*

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov "Viewpoint" commentary: "Disarmament Race"]

[Text] Almost simultaneously Washington and Moscow have declared their intention to radically reduce their nuclear arsenals. The packages of large-scale disarmament initiatives set forth by President Bush in his address "On the State of the Nation" and by President Yeltsin in his televised statement "On Russia's Policy in the Sphere of Limiting and Reducing Arms" have, in my

view, despite the obvious differences and veiled nuances intelligible only to experts, at least three similar features.

What is, above all, equally characteristic of them is their nontraditional approach to problems over which the sides spent many years conducting endless and fruitless arguments. (Incidentally, it was precisely this out-of-the-ordinary nature that elicited many critical comments which merit careful analysis). Second, the packages of proposals made in Washington and in Moscow are similar in that they combine unilateral steps with initiatives that are designed to be reciprocated. Third, and finally, the new stage of the "disarmament race" is designed, in addition to other tasks, to strengthen mutual trust under conditions of growing alarm throughout the world over the fate of the nuclear potential of the former Soviet Union. Now that the leaders of the two major nuclear powers have placed their cards on the table in advance, they will be able to conduct a dialogue at Camp David not in secret, but taking fully into account the comments both of their own peoples and of the world community.

The first chapters of the disarmament chronicle remind us that unilateral steps are, as a rule, rewarded—albeit sometimes in quite other areas of the overall process. This was the case with our moratorium announced in August 1985. Although the Americans did not wish to abandon nuclear tests entirely—neither then nor now that we have once again suspended them for a year—the good example helped to overcome the deadlock.

Last September, President Bush himself decided to give a boost to the "disarmament race." He announced that the United States was unilaterally renouncing tactical nuclear weapons sited in other countries. It is easy to explain the reason for such a unilateral step. On the eve of the breakup of the USSR there was no time left to hold talks lasting many years—this was the case, for example, with intermediate-range missiles. The best way to prompt the former Soviet republics to renounce tactical nuclear weapons and to avoid the fateful consequences of their use in interethnic conflicts was to resort to the force of example.

I believe that Washington's actions were justified in this case. According to Secretary of State Baker, tactical nuclear weapons are being dismantled in the Commonwealth countries even more actively than had been expected. Therefore the U.S. Administration has not only allocated \$400 million to assist this process but is also embarking on an exchange of specialists in this sphere with the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

Following on from tactical weapons, the U.S. President has evidently decided to use the same method again in order to remove the most formidable weapons from the two largest nuclear arsenals: ICBM's with multiple reentry vehicles. Bush declared that, if the CIS entirely renounces such land-based missiles, then the United States will destroy all its MX (or Peacekeeper) missiles, will leave just one warhead out of three on Minuteman

missiles, and, most importantly, will reduce by one-third (i.e. by more than 1,000) the total number of warheads on Trident-2 sea-launched missiles, which previously it had doggedly kept outside the disarmament process.

The desire to accelerate the forward movement by force of example is also apparent in Yeltsin's proposals. It has been declared, in particular, that Russia intends not over seven years but in just three to reduce the number of strategic offensive arms in alert status to the level agreed in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. I believe that competent specialists will have to weigh carefully how appropriate our age-old craving "to fulfill the five-year plan in four years" is in this case.

Speaking of proposals designed to be reciprocated, I would single out those that concern the Navy. Russia has halved the number of missile-carrying submarines on combat patrol and is prepared to stop combat patrolling altogether on a reciprocal basis. Russia is also prepared to eliminate all long-range nuclear cruise missiles based at sea if the United States does likewise. It is easy to foresee that it is on just this question that it will be hardest of all to reduce Yeltsin's and Bush's proposals to a common denominator, since our MIRVed ballistic missiles are based chiefly on dry land, whereas most of the U.S. equivalents are deployed on submarines.

According to U.S. specialists' estimates, the full realization of Bush's proposals would make it possible to reduce the strategic arsenals of the two biggest nuclear powers to 5,000-6,000 warheads. Yeltsin's statement names a still bolder aim: Each side is to retain 2,000-2,500 weapons. Moreover Russia and the United States must not target each other with the remaining strategic offensive arms.

The idea of retargeting Soviet missiles, which was first aired by Yeltsin in an ABC-TV interview, has mostly elicited criticisms from both the Soviet and the foreign public and even caused alarm in many countries. Where will Moscow target its missiles if it has stopped considering Washington its potential enemy?

It cannot fail to be seen, however, that, since the bipolar world has vanished into the past, the nature of the nuclear threat has changed too. Its sources have become less predictable and more numerous. Therefore I do not object to Russia's readiness to create together with the United States a global system of defense against limited nuclear missile attack. It is another matter that our present poverty will hardly enable the Russians to be equitable partners in developing the latest technologies, which with the Americans are generated by the generously funded SDI program.

The initiatives put forward almost simultaneously by the leaders of the two largest nuclear powers are so multifaceted in their composition that even the experts are probably finding it hard to interpret and compare them. But they will undoubtedly be the basis for a businesslike, constructive discussion both within the Security Council 31 January and during the Russian-American dialogue at Camp David 2 February.

Bush State of the Union Assessed

*PM3101123192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Jan 92 First Edition p 1*

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA observer Sergey Demidov commentary: "Although the 'Cold War' Is a Thing of the Past...."]

[Text] It has long been noted that politics is like seafaring—there can be deceptive lulls. It looks as though the relative lull in U.S. political life prompted by the short four-day time-out which the U.S. Administration took after last week's international coordinating conference on aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States ended, was broken 28 January by President George Bush. Speaking in Congress, he was delivering his traditional annual "State of the Union" address to the American people.

In it the White House incumbent set out the key changes in the structure of America's strategic forces and indicated the military appropriations to be cut. Washington will unilaterally abandon its development [sozdaniye] programs for the new "small" Midgetman ICBM. These will be replaced by an upgrade to the guidance system of the old Minutemen. The Department of Energy has been instructed to abandon production of W-88 MIRVed nuclear warheads for U.S. strategic missiles based on Trident submarines. Orders for the B-2 stealth bomber will be cut by more than two-thirds—from 75 to 20. The Pentagon is also cutting its purchases of MX cruise missiles [as published]. Only 640 will be acquired by the year's end instead of the 1,000 previously planned. Moreover, in the next five years the administration intends, as the President put it, to "save an additional \$50 billion on military spending."

These plans undoubtedly show the United States' desire to keep in step with the times and not lag behind the peace processes which have reached "cosmic" speeds particularly after the collapse of the totalitarian system in the ex-USSR and East Europe. Or, at any rate, they are a declaration of this desire. But, on the other hand, these measures show that Washington is by no means planning to rush headlong into a general "disarmament race."

In my view, the decisions announced by G. Bush were neither an adequate official response to the initiatives put forward by the Russian president in this sphere—as several commentators had forecast—nor a sensation. If only because, first, Boris Yeltsin's 10-point statement "On Russian Policy in Arms Limitation and Reduction" is far wider-ranging than Washington's steps. And it was officially announced almost eight hours after the U.S. President's speech in the Capitol (the Russian leader's statement on this score in an exclusive interview with ABC TV 25 January was far from exhaustive). And, second, G. Bush's message had been prepared long beforehand. But, thanks to skillfully arranged news "leaks," not only its substance but actual details of all the ideas fostered by the White House were known about.

Of course, what observers are calling the "most important speech of Bush's political life" was aimed not so much at an international audience as at the domestic American audience. In most observers' opinion, it was designed to "stem" the catastrophic slump in the Washington administration's popularity. This is if you believe the polls, which have fallen to 43-47 percent—that is, the lowest point in the current President's tenure of the Oval Office. This, understandably, does not inspire his "team" with optimism for the leap year or, as they say in America, the "lame-duck" year when the presidential elections are held.

All this prompted G. Bush to propose a "package of economic growth measures." It is geared to giving a boost to industrial production and business activity this year, when the end of the "cold war" battles means that the United States can afford to stop making sacrifices, as he put it, and no longer have to go without the U.S. authorities' economic and social programs because of the struggle against communism.

Only the future will tell whether this "medicine" will help to cure the U.S. economy.

As for the measures announced by the President to cut the "nuclear ceiling," they will probably be yet another basis for ensuring that the meeting between our two presidents scheduled for 1 February is fruitful.

At the same time, I think that the only genuine response to the Russian president's 29 January initiatives would be a reaffirmation by the head of the U.S. Administration of his intention to completely eliminate Peacekeeper—as the United States calls the MX nuclear missile—to reduce the warheads carried on each Minuteman to one per missile, to cut the number of warheads on sea-launched missiles by a third, and to convert a considerable number of strategic bombers into conventional bombers in exchange for our Commonwealth's destruction [unichtozheniye] of its ground-launched ballistic missiles with MIRVed warheads. Or, Washington could enter into at least some of these commitments.

So although the "cold war" is indeed a thing of the past, the "ball" is now in the U.S. court, and time is limited—since the current political lull cannot be expected to continue. All the more so as lulls in politics are always deceptive and fleeting.

Differences Between Packages Outlined

*LD3101225192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1910 GMT 31 Jan 92*

[Text] President Yeltsin's Package of Proposals on the Reduction of Strategic Weapons came almost at the same time as Mr. Bush's fresh Arms Control Initiatives. A spokesman for the Commonwealth forces command, Gen. Kuklev, has outlined what made the two packages different.

To begin with, said the general, Mr. Yeltsin's proposals are based on the newly emerging atmosphere in relations

between Russia and the United States as well as internationally. Gen. Kuklev believes the Russian package states a substantial departure from dependence on military force, something that was conspicuously absent from Mr. Bush's speech. And he quoted Mr. Bush as saying conflicts were over only for the dead and that although other difficulties were past, meaning super-power confrontation, new ones were emerging.

The general pointed to one other statement by the American President, saying there is an irrefutable fact that a show of force as a way of achieving peace is no evil. Gen. Kuklev said those statements indicated America's continued reliance on force, although priorities may have changed.

On all the differences between the proposals of the two presidents Gen. Kuklev explained the following: unlike Mr. Bush's offer, covering only strategic weapons, Mr. Yeltsin's was much wider, embracing issues such as anti-missile defenses, space, conventional, chemical and biological weapons. Asked if he thought that the two countries' proposals on strategic weapons were symmetric, Gen. Kuklev explained why it was hard to judge it all in terms of numbers.

The Americans say they are ready to scrap a total of 50 MX missiles, carrying 500 warheads, and reduce the number Minuteman III missiles, carrying cluster warheads, in exchange for the total elimination of all Soviet missiles with cluster warheads. Gen. Kuklev said Mr. Yeltsin's failure to clarify what he meant by saying Russia would bring down the number of warheads to 2,000 to 2,500 made it difficult to say exactly where there was symmetry in the proposed cuts. The U.S. proposals provides for a parity of 4,000 to 4,500 warheads on each side but Russia's was more sweeping.

On whether Russian missiles would be retargeted, following Mr. Yeltsin's statement, Gen. Kuklev described it as political. The Russian leader's statement, he said, providing for the remainder of the strategic weapons not to be targeted on Russian [as heard] and American cities was technically viable. The general said experts on both sides should be allowed to come up with relevant recommendations, but overall, the measure would help considering there was a greater strategic stability at any given moment than the permanent feeling of being under gunpoint. Gen. Kuklev reiterated that Mr. Yeltsin's offer must be taken as a political statement for the time being.

Georgiy Arbatov on Defense Doctrine

*LD0202230492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Feb 92*

[From the "Itogi" program]

[Text] [Announcer Yevgeniy Kiselev] One thing is clear: The Russian president's speech containing proposals for broad arms reductions pursued perfectly understandable political goals, the main one being to reassure the West,

which has been alarmed by statements about a threat of new nuclear instability as a result of the collapse of the USSR and internal friction in the Commonwealth of Independent States. But ultimately in the tranquillity of the West lies the fate of our economic reform, the fate of capital investments, the fate of cooperation with the West.

Some information from the sociologists: A public opinion poll specially conducted for our program by the independent Institute of the Sociology of Parliamentarianism under the leadership of (Nugzar Betonelli) has revealed that an absolute majority of people support Yeltsin's decision to change Russia's military doctrine. [video shows screen with question: Do you support the initiative of B.N. Yeltsin for changing Russia's military doctrine? The accompanying diagram indicates that 76 percent replied "Yes," 12 percent "No," and 12 percent "Don't know"]

Thus public opinion is in favor of arms reductions. Some specialists, however, fear that on the kind of scale proposed by Yeltsin, this could be fraught with unpredictable social consequences. Our expert considers that there is such a danger, but that the rejection of conversion is equally dangerous.

[Georgiy Arbatov, Yeltsin adviser, director of the U.S. and Canada Institute] There is such a danger, if we implement an unskillful policy, if we do not take the appropriate measures. But if we do not do it, social shocks will be inevitable for all. Even from the defense point of view, if economic disintegration continues further—and our economic disintegration has been greatly boosted by excessive military expenditure—in our country 40 percent of the fixed capital in industry is in defense; that is impossible, even in wartime that cannot be kept up for long, you understand, and if this continues we face complete collapse. Even if we went over to an ideal market and did everything, that is impossible. There are things that are impossible. In that case no army at all would be possible and no armaments at all. So a choice has to be made.

However, there are things that can be done painlessly. By all means, for one year, two years, three years you can maintain a military enterprise in the defense industry, you can maintain its pay, even indexed—given current inflation, that is essential—but on condition that during this time they carry out diversification.

Kazakh President Welcomes Yeltsin Statement

*LD3101185192 Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network
in Kazakh 1500 GMT 31 Jan 92*

[Text] The press service of the president of the Republic has distributed the following announcement:

People in Kazakhstan approve of the statement about Russia's policy of limiting and reducing weapons because it responds to their interests. The aspiration for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is one of the main directions of the policy of Kazakhstan's leadership. The statement by the Russian leadership contains the

true position in essence regarding the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons on a parity basis. The further fate of this type of weapon cannot but worry the inhabitants of the Republic.

It has come about that Kazakhstan has become a nuclear power, but not by its own will. For decades, nuclear weapons were produced there as part of the USSR; test complexes and the corresponding infrastructure were created. This fact must be judged not as an aspiration of Kazakhstan to possess lethal weapons at all costs, but as an historic reality that must not be left out of the reckoning. People in Kazakhstan believe that the reduction of strategic weapons is an irreversible process. However, it must be part of a single defense concept for the Commonwealth—a form of military doctrine. Unfortunately, so far this does not exist; there are only the first outlines. The statement by the head of the Russian Federation can be considered one such outline. The progressive ideas contained in it require a number of clarifications and agreements to be reached with all member-states of the Commonwealth, and first and foremost with those possessing nuclear potential.

The leadership of Kazakhstan has more than once and at various levels declared its unswerving stand in relation to the obligations it has undertaken to join in every way the world process of nonproliferation, step-by-step reduction, and full elimination of nuclear weapons. The Republic realizes that it will only be able to become a full-fledged member of the world community as an independent state if it adheres to these humanitarian principles of its policy.

'Reliability' of Yeltsin's Program Viewed

PM0402093592 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Baturin: "What Makes Arms Race Dangerous?"]

[Text] The initial stage of each rule in our country, except for the very brief ones, has been marked by graphic proposals for disarmament, unilateral moratoriums, and other political actions so far-reaching that it is truly surprising how military technology survived at all until the next even more striking initiative.

Russia's present proposals differ from previous ones in at least three ways.

First, they are accompanied by counterproposals by the United States.

Second, these steps have a chance of being considerably more effective in speed and scope since the former "potential enemy" is extremely frightened of unnatural chaos among the USSR's heavily armed heirs. Being very worried by that fact, it is prepared to pay for many measures (and disarmament is quite expensive) which reduce the danger of war from its new friends.

Third, this time the design in the grand chess game is to turn the hopeless military position into an effective

draw. But there still has to be a careful assessment of how all this will affect internal Russian affairs.

For instance, will a 700,000-strong reduction of the servicemen of the former Union's armed forces not repeat the just-as-massive dismissal from the army implemented long ago by N.S. Khrushchev, as a result of which a huge number of homeless appeared in our country, the fate of many people without civilian specialities was broken, and crime increased? Has this all been thought out, particularly with a consideration for the not too successful experience of withdrawing Soviet Army units from East Europe?

Or take the possible side effects. A report has gotten into the press that the Americans suggested paying for the work of our nuclear physicists here in this country to prevent them from scattering around the world, mainly to countries which dream of having their own bombs. One can imagine who would be on the hypothetical "dollar lists" were the United States to ask us to compile them! Aggrieved by the flagrant injustice the rejected nuclear physicists will try to prove who is worth what. To prevent that passport restrictions will obviously be intensified, that is the past will return in that respect. I should also like to take a look in that perspective at the planned measures to control the export of technologies with a dual application.

In brief, there should be a comprehensive study of the program proposed by President Yeltsin.

It also contains unrealistic things—the creation, together with the United States, of a global system to replace SDI. Let us leave aside for the moment the level of reliability of such a system. But it is madly expensive (even if the financial burden is divided in half) and beyond the means of what is frankly a poor country. In addition so much money has already been put into SDI that even the rich Americans will hardly decide to make something in its place. How will third countries look at the claim of the two powers to control global security? Finally, will the United States allow the Russians access to its top secrets despite all their good relations? Hardly. In fact it all comes down to purchasing several technologies (lasers and so forth) from Russia and to a brain drain across the ocean.

The transfer of the SDI system and similar developments of ours to a "partnership regime" looks more feasible. One of the weaknesses of SDI is that it does not accord with the rules for working up interacting systems requiring the implementation of joint full-scale tests. Nor could it be otherwise under conditions of confrontation. But an opportunity appears here to play with models of what would happen and how.

Of course, it would be a project of the Apollo-Soyuz type. We learned a lot of interest from each other, created a joint docking module, docked once, shook each other's hands, and never made use of the module again. But ultimately it is possible to exchange space information again, which would increase mutual trust, and to think up other forms of cooperation. But one way or another

the whole idea of replacing SDI is a good moneyspinner from the military-industrial complex, which receives big orders for a long time.

Of course, it is still possible to reach a draw, but the options still have to be calculated repeatedly.

Yeltsin Initiatives Said To Benefit 'Universal Security'

LD0302154192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] The Russian President has visited New York, Washington, and Ottawa. In New York President Yeltsin addressed the summit of the UN Security Council and also met with the leaders of some countries that took part in the summit meeting.

It seems that Russia is joining the world's leading countries, and then preserving all the best that the Soviet foreign policy has accumulated over the past years. The Russian leadership goes even further in the sphere of disarmament and in transforming its relations with foreign nations. It is good that such intentions draw a positive response. An indication to this were the talks held by President Yeltsin. Assessing the results of the meeting between the Russian and the U.S. presidents, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev has said that the talks signify a new quality of relations between Russia and the United States and a switch from confrontation to recognition of the fact that our countries are no longer enemies, even potentially, and have friendly relations likely to turn into those of allies. According to Andrey Kozyrev this means the entire post war structure based on confrontation has collapsed.

And yet another thing, transforming its relations with Western countries Russia intends to preserve and develop its traditionally friendly contacts with Third World countries. Situated at the junction of Europe and Asia it would like to carry out an historic mission of a link between the East and the West.

While commenting on President Yeltsin's tour the foreign analysts stressed the importance of the implementation of the Russian and American disarmament initiatives. Of special interest was the proposal advanced by President Yeltsin at the United Nations Security Council summit about the creation of a global security system in outer space and on earth that could be beneficial for everybody. Some observers note that the Russian president's proposals go even further than the American ones. For instance, Moscow proposes to cut the number of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles down to 2,500 pieces while Washington only down to 4,500 warheads.

No matter who would win in the disarmament race the benefits for the universal security is obvious. Naturally Russia can carry out its good intentions only if it finds its firm feet. Some people believe that Moscow hopes to swap its measures on disarmament for the economic aid.

The idea was also advanced by the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Commander in Chief Marshal Shaposhnikov, who said that if the reforms slowed down or are cut short Russia and the Commonwealth could return to the totalitarianism they used to have earlier. That would mean a new arms race and a possible come back to reprisals, which is unacceptable both for the CIS countries and the world as a whole. This is the essence of Russia's appeal to other states for economic aid and the idea finds appropriate response.

On the whole President Yeltsin's tour has helped to bring Russia's relations with other nations to a qualitatively higher level and crown the efforts taken earlier by the Russian Federation on the international scene.

U.S., World Response to Yeltsin Proposals Weighed

PM0302153192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 92 p 4

[Report by Vladislav Drobkov: "From New York to Camp David. Guidelines for World Development in Years Ahead Outlined"]

[Text] Washington, 2 Feb—It would be hard to find two more dissimilar places: the soaring skyscrapers and human anthill that is New York, and the wooded unpopulated foothills of Camp David. The bustle, noise, and stress of a huge city and the precious peace of a winter park....

However, at the end of last week these two such different points on the U.S. map attracted general attention and were linked by an unseen thread. The megalopolis on the Hudson and the quiet of the U.S. presidential retreat in the foothills of the Appalachians were both venues for a discussion of the same problems—the dramatic changes which have taken place in the world in the past few months, the collapse of the USSR, and the emergence on the world arena of a dozen or so new independent states. The president of the largest of these—Russia—took part in an unprecedented UN Security Council session in New York at heads of state and government level, and then had a working meeting with the U.S. President at Camp David. He thereby reaffirmed the Russian Federation's role as the successor to the USSR as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and as the second largest nuclear power. This confirmation was not merely in line with the Russian leadership's desire to take its rightful place in a world community shaken by the rapid and, for many people, unexpected collapse of one of the superpowers. The world community itself has been striving to get firsthand information as quickly as possible about Russia's intentions and to discuss the possible impact of the upheavals taking place on the territory of the former USSR and their effect on the international situation.

This information has been obtained. Speaking at the UN Security Council session, B.N. Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia's readiness to resolutely cut its nuclear arms and to continue to prevent any proliferation [raspolzaniye] of

mass destruction weaponry. The Russian president emphasized the desire to develop mutually advantageous good-neighborly relations with all countries. Russia, he stated, sees Western states not only as partners but as its allies. This is a fundamental prerequisite for a revolution in the sphere of peaceful cooperation between progressive states, he noted.

As if reinforcing his desire to move from a partnership relationship to an ally relationship with the Western countries, the Russian president put forward an initiative which has produced a wide reaction and sometimes contradictory commentaries here. B.N. Yeltsin proposed setting up a global security system based on the U.S. strategic defense initiative (SDI) and the ABM defense technology held by the successors to the USSR. Even the U.S. military seemed flabbergasted by this idea. Commenting on the prospects for strategic cooperation between our two countries, Pentagon chief R. Cheney stated that hitherto "we were not ready to go further than a very limited exchange—in the sphere of missile launch early warning, for example." He expressed hesitation about U.S. readiness to enter into this kind of collaboration.

On the other hand, Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces, who was accompanying the Russian president on the tour, was totally resolute. In an interview with journalists at UN Headquarters in New York, he stated that we should not be hostage to our old, unfriendly relations, and that we would be entirely capable, together with the United States, of creating a system which would prevent any "unsanctioned use" of nuclear weapons by "third countries." Such a system, in the marshal's opinion, could be based on the space systems [sredstvo] developed [razrabotanny] by the Americans and on the ground-based ABM systems developed [razrabotanny] by Russia.

It is not hard to imagine the reaction that such a joint program could have in "third countries." It is no accident that local commentators are now writing about the unprecedented change in Moscow's position vis-a-vis the U.S. "star wars" program, and THE WASHINGTON POST described B.N. Yeltsin's speech as the "most dramatic speech heard at Friday's [31 January] UN Security Council session."

"We want to start a new era today by stating that the United States and Russia are no longer potential enemies!" the Russian president told the frozen journalists as soon as he got out of the helicopter which had ferried him to the U.S. President's country residence at Camp David 1 February.

B.N. Yeltsin and G. Bush met the press some three hours later. It was clear from their appearance that they were both pleased with the talks. "This historic meeting is further confirmation of the end of the 'cold war' and the start of a new era," the U.S. President said, opening the brief news conference. "Russia and the United States are moving to a new relationship based on trust, adherence

to economic and political freedom, and firm hope in genuine cooperation," he continued. G. Bush said that he had invited B. Yeltsin to pay an official visit to the United States this spring. The invitation has been accepted. For his part, the U.S. President also accepted an invitation to subsequently pay an official visit to Russia.

Judging by the two president's replies to the journalists' questions, they held a wide-ranging exchange of views on many problems of bilateral relations—from humanitarian aid to the fate of strategic arms. B. Yeltsin reported that all tactical weapons had already been moved from Kazakh to Russian territory. The withdrawal of these weapons from Belarus is nearing completion. Tactical weapons will have been withdrawn to Russian territory from Ukraine by 1 July. The problem of strategic missiles is also being resolved.

The previous report that the former Soviet nuclear missiles are no longer targeted on the United States was confirmed. The U.S. President was asked whether Washington intended to follow the Russian example. G. Bush promised that this problem was being looked into....

Answering a PRAVDA correspondent's question about whether the question of the joint development [sozdaniye] with the United States of a strategic security system was discussed, the Russian president said that such a discussion had taken place. George Bush, B.N. Yeltsin stated, reaffirmed that "this subject is exceptionally important and it would be interesting if we were to operate these systems on a mutual basis and perhaps even with the participation of other nuclear powers." This requires specific and very detailed examination by specialists, he said.

The presidents reported that agreement had been reached on continuing the discussion on bilateral problems at the foreign ministerial talks to be held in the very near future. U.S. Secretary of State Baker will arrive in Moscow in mid-February to this end. G. Bush reaffirmed that the United States supports Russia's membership of the IMF.

B. Yeltsin stated that he had not come to the United States to "hold out his hand and ask for aid." "We are calling for cooperation," he stressed, "cooperation for the sake of the whole world. Because if reform in Russia were to be choked off it would mean that the 'cold war' would turn into a 'hot war.' There would again be an arms race, there would again be the kind of regime which we have only just gotten rid of. This must not be allowed to happen. That is why the entire world community should participate in the reforms," the Russian president said.

Bush, Cheney Cited on Talks With Yeltsin

*LD0302135292 Moscow TASS in English
1213 GMT 3 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Stanislav Lunev and Sergey Babich]

[Text] Washington, February 3 TASS—President George Bush highly assessed the recent Camp David talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin at an unofficial meeting with state governors in the White House on Sunday [2 February]. He said he regarded the talks as the most dramatic event amidst the current world changes.

Bush said the Russian Federation was confronted with major problems, but many things happening there deserved profound respect, primarily Russia's efforts to safeguard world peace.

The U.S. President believes the talks with Yeltsin have shown that he really wants the current reforms to be implemented, is eager to bring democracy to his huge Federation and to ensure its progress on the basis of liberty.

New York February 3—Interviewed by the CNN TV Company, U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said that President Bush's meeting with Boris Yeltsin was friendly and warm. He believes this is perfectly understandable, since Yeltsin is the first Russian leader in the country's age-long history, who became president as a result of democratic elections. Cheney said the meeting was very useful.

Asked whether any further nuclear weapon cuts were needed, Cheney said there was no doubt about it. He believes it is worth doing it.

According to Cheney, Secretary of State Baker will go to Moscow within the next two weeks, accompanied by representatives from the Pentagon, who will discuss with the Russians in detail all the problems linked with subsequent steps to cut armaments.

The secretary of defence said that the two countries now had relations that could not be compared to anything in their past histories.

U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation Robert Strauss told the CNN that all the world wanted Yeltsin's positions to be strengthened, wanted him to become stronger, more popular with his people and more effective in his endeavours. He said the U.S. was interested precisely in such a partner. In Strauss's opinion, President Bush and Secretary of State Baker share this view.

The New York "NEWSDAY" published a report on Yeltsin's and Bush's meeting under the title "Russia and the United States Are Friends Today". The newspaper says that after the meeting both leaders had declared themselves friends and allies in the forthcoming "new era".

Yeltsin Tour Said To Mirror Gorbachev Approach

PM0402150792 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Feb 92 p 4

[Viktor Linnik article: "Returning From Distant Lands... Do Gorbachev's Foreign-Policy Mistakes Await Yeltsin?"]

[Text] Once again, as has been the case throughout the past seven years, it is nicer to travel to the West than to

tour the former USSR. Yeltsin's speech in New York and his talks in London, Camp David, and Ottawa promised repose for the soul—unlike the wrangling with Kravchuk over the fate of the Black Sea Fleet or the need to react to the daily unraveling statehood of what is now Russia. After all, on the very day of Yeltsin's arrival overseas, news arrived of Tatarstan's declaration of independence, of Kravchuk's demands for the removal of Russian Admiral Kasatonov from his post as fleet commander, and of the start of the latest round in the bloody and protracted battle for Nagorno-Karabakh.

So it is no surprise that the effect of distancing yourself from domestic woes is for Yeltsin (just as it was for his predecessor) like balm on a wound. Meanwhile, the security of the country which elected him president is now being decided not so much in Washington as in Kiev, Grozny, Kazan, and Tbilisi.

Yeltsin has succumbed to the temptation which is so familiar to us from the Kremlin's previous incumbent: looking abroad for solutions to domestic problems. His entourage has concluded that the fate of the Yeltsin reforms—and consequently of the Yeltsin government—is now in the hands of the West. If the West wants to help, the presidential advisers reason, the government will survive. If the West does not want to help, the government will founder, as will its experiment of stripping the clothes from 95 percent of its own people. So Yeltsin's trip and the announcement of sensational disarmament measures which preceded it are aimed at winning Western sympathies in the hope of gaining meaningful aid for our suddenly hapless country.

Indeed, is there much economic sense for Russians in the announced cut in Russia's nuclear weapons? In the immediate future, absolutely none. At best, savings from the announced cuts will have an impact only after about 10 years. In the meantime we will have to suffer the woes of the inevitable social imbalance caused by the promised fulfillment of the disarmament "seven-year plan in three years."

This rapid round of personal diplomacy by Yeltsin had several aims. First, to raise the Russian president's prestige in the eyes of Western leaders, who were somewhat skeptical about him. Second, to win the long talked-about Western economic aid, which is now needed to ensure Russia's survival probably even more than in 1941-42.

The themes of the Russian president's talks and his speech at the United Nations were tailored to these purposes, as was his declaration—hastily issued on the eve of the trip—of his intention to cut the Russian nuclear arsenal. The tendency to make major unilateral declarations on disarmament without any preliminary studies being done with experts on the other side has become a kind of hallmark of "new thinking." Bush inherited this tradition from Gorbachev, Gorbachev from Khrushchev, and Yeltsin has clearly inherited it from all of them. These declarations are, on the one hand, a recognition of the obvious fact that both sides

have built up masses of excess weaponry which is inevitably aging and will have to be gotten rid of one way or another. On the other hand, public diplomacy is called just that because it is aimed at the public and at producing the maximum propaganda effect. Bush is making his statements with an eye to this year's presidential elections; Yeltsin is making his in the hope of setting foreign-policy success against the catastrophic state of affairs at home. These proposals—made this time literally on the eve of the meeting between the two presidents—were at best discussed in the most general terms at Camp David, since experts from both countries will have to spend a long time working out the details. So no rapid progress on these ideas should be expected as a result of the talks.

The most advantageous aspect of Yeltsin's proposals from our point of view was the linkage of our cuts to cuts in the U.S. sea-launched nuclear arsenal, where the United States has an undisputed unilateral advantage. The idea of setting up a global SDI system is a revival of the old idea put forward in Washington a few years ago by Reagan, either in the heat of the moment or out of foolishness. It is good that we have finally taken him at his word.

Yeltsin's announcement of the "retargeting" of Russian missiles away from U.S. cities is not such a sensational piece of news. The Americans announced a similar measure with respect to us a long time ago—back in the days when J. Schlesinger was U.S. defense secretary. At the time, I recall, we were very indignant about it, because the targeting of military installations theoretically increases the temptation for the retargeters to carry out a first nuclear strike against the other side's missile silos.

While according the Russian president the ritual honors due to the successor to the USSR, the West is at the same time perfectly well aware that Russia is not the Union. Even Gorbachev spoke at the United Nations as president of the USSR; Yeltsin represents an imploding Russia whose external borders have been eroded. The statement that Russia, with its nuclear potential, is a superpower is nothing more than reassuring hype. You could with almost equal success consider Ukraine and Kazakhstan—whose nuclear potentials far exceed the French and British arsenals—to be superpowers.

Of course, there is no avoiding continuity. Having taken the place on the Security Council originally given to the USSR under Stalin, B. Yeltsin took a good look at the seat once occupied by Vyshinskiy. But in the entire postwar period the backdrop for contacts between Russia and the West has never been as favorable for us as it is now. We have never been so weak. "Stabilization of the reform process" in Russia directly depends on Western input—that has been unambiguously stated by both Yeltsin and Gaydar. One point should be remembered: Western governments do not have the kind of money which would be of decisive importance for us. We are not Poland or Upper Volta—the magnitudes are different. The West could not even keep Gorbachev—its

best friend in recent years—in the Kremlin, so it did not grant him any meaningful economic aid. Under no circumstances will the United States enter into large-scale aid in presidential election year—Bush would simply not be forgiven by either the opposition or the American voters. And U.S. business, which could invest money without asking the government's permission, is scared...scared of our ruin, our collapse, and our guns. The former USSR has been replaced by dozens of "banana republics." But without bananas....

Moreover, the West is watching with alarm not only the growing dispute between the sovereign states within the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] but also—with no less alarm—the protracted squabbling in the top ranks of Russian power. This is weakening Yeltsin's position in his contacts with Western leaders. No country can have real success in foreign policy without success at home. We saw enough evidence of that in the previous seven years. Moreover, the West objectively has an interest in ensuring that the CIS remains a rickety formation. The sequence in which the independent republics were recognized by the Western community shows that people want to make the collapse of the USSR irreversible.

Incidentally, in his contacts with the West Yeltsin has one indisputable advantage over his predecessor: He is the legitimate popularly elected leader of his country. Admittedly, in the Atlantic leaders' eyes even this mandate can seem very relative—something we learned from the foreign attitude to Gamsakhurdia. But Yeltsin is Gorbachev's match when it comes to charm, and considerably superior to him when it comes to resolve. But the concept of liking or not liking a leader is not a suitable one for big-league politics.

In his desire to win Western sympathy, during his tour the Russian leader has been diligently playing up the theme of Russia's liberation from "communist fetters"—something, it should be realized, in which he played a leading part. Western political leaders, of course, do have minor shortcomings, but naivety is not generally among them. That is why they are not particularly inclined in this sense to believe the former candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, who spent no less than 30 years calling for the victory of communism in his country. The Russian leadership should have no illusions on that score. So there is no point in playing this card again and again. It is patently not a trump card. Moreover, the following thesis was heard during the visit: Russia should become the bridge between East and West. But we may well ask: To what extent could the now-anticommunist Moscow serve as a bridge to communist Beijing, with whom we have a common border around 3,000 km long?

Yeltsin's tour has shown that, among all the leaders of the former Soviet republics, he seems to be winning the race for popularity in the West. Will this victory be enough to give his government stability and strengthen his position in the heightening competition within the CIS? There is no answer to that question as yet....

Yeltsin Initiative Described as 'Promising, Extraordinary'

PM0602160592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 92 p 1

[Report by ITAR-TASS Military Observer A. Naryshkin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "The World Will Be More Stable and Safer for All"]

[Text] "A promising, extraordinary, and bold step in the disarmament sphere," is how Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] Armed Forces Information Directorate, described the Russian president's statement on the state's policy in the arms limitation and reduction sphere.

As he noted in an interview with your ITAR-TASS observer, the idea of designing, creating, and jointly operating a global antimissile defense system, which was viewed positively during the Russian-U.S. top level talks at Camp David, is particularly attractive. The realization of such an approach, the general noted, could clearly provide far more reliable guarantees of international security than the elaboration of any national program, including the U.S. SDI. If, after joint and equivalent [paritetnyy] reductions the strategic missiles of the United States and the CIS are not aimed at cities and other civilian targets and if radical reductions of these essentially irrational weapons are made down to complete elimination, based on the principles of reciprocity, of course, and involving all the members of the nuclear club, the world will be far more stable and secure for all, Valeriy Manilov said.

It will obviously take time for the Russian president's initiatives, like any political document of this scale, to gain specific military-technical content. The search for the specific forms in which they are to be embodied and the elaboration of a legal base and implementation and verification mechanisms will be conducted during consultations and talks at all levels—head of state and military expert levels. It will be difficult work, of course, but as is well known, nothing ventured, nothing gained, the general remarked.

As for the U.S. side's counter disarmament proposals, according to Valeriy Manilov they have been received with interest at the CIS Armed Forces Main Command and General Staff. These proposals are now being studied carefully. The adoption of decisions must be preceded by a comprehensive and objective assessment of the character and scale of the reduction of the military arsenals of the country which is no longer our likely enemy and together with which we are to create a qualitatively new, all-embracing security system based on the priority of political means, trust, and good neighborliness, the Information Directorate chief concluded.

GENERAL

Prospects for Joint EC 'Nuclear Button' Viewed

924P0054A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Correspondent Yuriy Kovalenko report: "Common Nuclear Button for the EC"]

[Text] Paris—France has proposed to its European Community partners the elaboration of a European nuclear doctrine, which would be a most important aspect of a common policy in the defense sphere.

This presupposes that Paris and London subsequently put at the disposal of the "12" their nuclear forces, which, by all accounts, would be under a common command. The elaboration of such a doctrine will very soon be a principal task for the EC, Francois Mitterrand declared, addressing a national meeting on problems of European integration which was being held in Paris. He observed that, following the achievement of agreements on political and currency and economic unions of the EC at the recent meeting in Maastricht, the way was open to the creation of common European defenses. In this connection the "12" had to resolve a number of problems, including the problem of the use of nuclear weapons.

This viewpoint is supported by many convinced supporters of European integration. Thus Jacques Delors, chairman of the European Communities Commission, recently declared that the French nuclear forces should ultimately be at the disposal of the EC. If the European Community one day becomes a strong political union, he said, why not transfer the nuclear weapons to this political authority?

The mere formulation of the question of the French nuclear arsenals being put at the disposal of the "12" signifies Paris' possible radical revision of its defense concept. For the past 30 years France has made paramount the sovereignty of its own armed forces and quit NATO's military organization for this reason.

But now, when Paris, together with Bonn, is acting as a principal pioneer of the creation of European defenses independent of NATO, such an initiative on the part of President F. Mitterrand would seem logical. It is impossible to propose the formulation of a common military policy within the framework of the EC and uphold the sovereign nature of one's own nuclear forces here. European solidarity, former French Foreign Minister J. Francois-Poncet observed, implies nuclear solidarity also.

Paris is having to revise the doctrine of deterrence by virtue of geopolitical factors also. The former Soviet Union, against which this doctrine was directed, is no longer a source of direct danger to France. And its tactical nuclear forces could strike only at the territory of its allies. Under these conditions "sovereign" nuclear weapons, which in the past served the "grandeur" of France, threaten to become an anachronism.

Who would have his hand on the common nuclear button? The transfer of nuclear forces to a unified European command, the newspaper *LE FIGARO* believes, presupposes the existence of the institution of an all-European presidency disposing of the same authority as the presidency in the United States. This is still a long way off, of course.

The more so in that Great Britain—the other nuclear European power—has a very reserved attitude toward the mere idea of the building of European defenses, which would lead to a weakening of the role of NATO. London would like its nuclear forces to remain at the disposal of the North Atlantic alliance, which could use them if this were not contrary to British interests.

Together with the nuclear doctrine F. Mitterrand also touched in his program speech devoted to European integration on the question of France's ratification of the agreements on political and currency and economic unions reached in Maastricht. These agreements will, if this is what the French people want, usher in, according to the president, a new era and be a decisive moment in France's history.

F. Mitterrand acknowledged that they provide for a partial renunciation of sovereignty for France, but rejection of the agreements on the political and currency and economic unions in Europe would mean a "national tragedy" and lead to profound crisis. The president has not yet decided in what way he will propose their ratification—either by way of referendum or by way of parliamentary decision.

He returned once again to his idea of a European confederation of East and West uniting all the continent's democratic forces. At the present time, the EC believes, there can be no question of admitting the East European states as new members to the Community for economic and political reasons.

Nonetheless, the EC cannot, in the president's opinion, egotistically withdraw into itself. It is essential to build a Europe whose cornerstone is the Community. It is necessary to aspire everywhere to the creation of permanent all-European structures, within which each country, whatever its dimensions, feels itself to be on a par with others.

Military 'Adviser' on Republic Ties, Arms Issues

PM3101154692 Milan L'UNITA in Italian
26 Jan 92 p 12

[Interview with Sergey Karaganov, Russian Government adviser on military questions, by Jolanda Bufalini in Milan; date not given]

[Text] Milan—Sergey Karaganov is one of the young representatives of the new Russian ruling class which has supplanted the Soviet gerontocracy. An economist by training, he is the Russian Government's adviser on military and foreign questions. He is in Milan for the meeting of the council for relations between Italy and the United States on investments in the former USSR. We

spoke with him about the most recent problem—that of the dangerous opposition between the two sister republics of Ukraine and Russia, which until recently formed the imposing basis of Soviet power and which are now protagonists in a problem which involves world diplomacy. "Relations between us and Kiev are so complex," Karaganov said, "that even the treaty on conventional arms is now inappropriate." And in the nuclear sphere, the West "must make haste and help us in the technical and political spheres." The instability of the situation does not guarantee that the pledges given now in Kiev will be valid in the future. [passage omitted]

[Bufalini] All the republics which possess nuclear weapons have expressed the desire to get rid of them, do you think that these positions can be trusted?

[Karaganov] Different statements are being made about nuclear and conventional weapons. There is a real possibility of reducing tactical nuclear weapons. With the West's technical and political aid, it is possible to achieve the complete withdrawal of tactical weapons from the Ukraine and that will make possible a drastic reduction in the deployment of that kind of weapon. However, it is necessary to move quickly, within six months, because political instability could bring people to power in Kiev who do not feel at all obliged by the agreements between James Baker and Leonid Kravchuk.

[Bufalini] And what about conventional weapons?

[Karaganov] In my view the Vienna conventional arms treaty does not correspond to the current situation. Of course, ratification has political value but, although I myself took part in drawing up the treaty, ratifying it would have no military significance. In Ukraine, there is a huge army, around 1 million men, the biggest army on Soviet territory. The Ukrainian Government wants to create a national force. Talking of reduction amid this confusion is unrealistic. What must be maintained, partly by ratification, is the reduction process as a whole, maintaining the principle of military openness, and the confidence-building and inspection mechanisms.

Text of Yeltsin Letter to UN Secretary General

PM3101130292 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Jan 92 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Letter from Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin under the rubric "Russia and the World": "To His Excellency Butrus Ghali, UN Secretary General, New York"]

[Text] Esteemed Secretary General:

Among the tasks facing a Russia which has slipped the fetters of totalitarianism and is being born again to freedom and democracy, the determination of its role in maintaining and strengthening international peace and security—not least in the light of the special responsibility incumbent on Russia by dint of its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council—is of the greatest importance.

Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, on a territory which is the homeland of many peoples in several continents, Russia must finally fulfill its unique, historic mission of being the link between East and West.

Resolution of this key task presupposes the fulfillment of two most important conditions—safeguarding stability within the former USSR and organizing constructive collaboration with other states to strengthen international security.

The steps taken by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to ensure reliable unified control of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and the actions we are taking to preserve the core of the Joint Armed Forces with a unified command and to promote interethnic harmony constitute recognition of this lofty responsibility.

Together with the other members of the international community, Russia is prepared to make its weighty contribution to the shaping of a single global cooperation and security area. We intend to follow this long-term guideline in formulating and implementing our policy in the arms limitation and reduction sphere.

The rapid march of freedom, which overturned the remnants of imperial structures in just a few months, has with a historical inevitability restored to Russians the real values shared by the rest of the civilized world—freedom of the individual, freedom of choice, initiative, and enterprise, and the supremacy of the law.

The “iron curtain” which, reinforced by a “siege mentality” doctrine imposed on the people, had cut us off from the rest of the world, has finally crumbled.

Healing the artificial rift that had split the world into two enemy camps is the great event of the end of the 20th century. The world is regaining its unity on the firm foundation of democratic values and human rights. Mankind is entering a new era.

In the context of the qualitatively new political realities now emerging, a fundamental reevaluation by the international community of the problems of safeguarding international and national security is required.

As far as Russia is concerned, the concept of its general national [obshchenatsionalnyy] security will henceforth rest on the principles of effective global and regional military-political stability.

The building of a new world order based on common democratic values and legal norms will require that all states adopt radical measures to dismantle excess military potentials that have been maintained out of inertia, and reduce them to levels where the peoples will finally be freed from all fear of the possible destruction of human civilization itself.

While moving toward a humane and demilitarized world order, we naturally have no right to ignore the challenges which may be willfully thrown down to the international community and to stability and prosperity worldwide by

certain irresponsible politicians. The unified and indivisible peace whose creation is advocated by Russia and all the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states presupposes the existence of effective mechanisms to counter any acts of aggression and international lawlessness. National armed forces structures should be geared more than they are at present to the goals of safeguarding collective security. Proceeding on this basis, Russia will promote in every possible way the further strengthening of the role of the United Nations and its peacekeeping institutions—including, if necessary, providing its own Armed Forces under constitutional procedures for participation in corresponding international action.

Russia states that it is prepared to cooperate in this direction with all states and international organizations. It confirms that it will not use armed force against any other state or states under any circumstances—save in response to aggression against it or its friends and allies—and will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

A key avenue in our efforts to create a single global security area will be active participation in and promotion of the arms limitation and reduction process.

Disarmament is a traditional Russian priority. It goes back to The Hague conferences which were initiated by Russia at the end of last century and the start of this century. And today we see disarmament as one of the most important tools in safeguarding national security and strengthening international peace and stability.

As the successor state [gosudarstvo-prodolzhatel] to the former USSR, Russia reaffirms all commitments under existing and signed bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements in the arms limitation and disarmament sphere and will unswervingly observe them.

In the military-political and military-strategic sphere we will firmly adhere to the following long-term guidelines.

We will build our Armed Forces in such a way as to ensure that they cannot be used for purposes other than defense and peacekeeping operations in accordance with decisions made by the international community.

En route to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere, we will strive to cut nuclear forces to the minimum level able to guarantee the prevention of war. And any incentive to launch a first disabling strike should be ruled out.

We are no longer enemies of the United States and the other NATO countries and we consider it outdated to be each other's nuclear targets. We must resolutely eschew this legacy of the period of confrontation and cold war by means of joint efforts. The processes of nuclear disarmament, the need for which we are being made to face so pressingly by the interests of the world's peoples, will be incomplete and inadequate if implemented solely within the framework of relations between Russia and the United States. The other nuclear powers—China, Britain, and France—should not remain aloof and build up their offensive nuclear arsenals in an uncontrolled

manner, which could destabilize the international situation in the very near future. They should also participate in the processes of real nuclear disarmament.

Along with nuclear weapons we advocate the complete elimination of all other kinds of mass destruction weaponry under effective verification.

We advocate the adoption of effective measures to strengthen the nonproliferation regime for nuclear and other mass destruction weapons and delivery systems.

We are committed to ensuring the utmost reciprocal openness, predictability, and confidence-building measures in the military sphere, including military doctrines, defense budgets, plans for armed forces building and operations, and the international arms trade.

We are open to cooperation in drawing up additional measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of war as a result of an accident, miscalculation, or terrorism, and at ruling out military incidents.

We will promote and participate in the creation of collective security structures based on the UN Charter.

The vision of the aforesaid long-term guidelines in the disarmament sphere dictates the need for the speediest adoption of a range of effective measures—both in collaboration with our partners and unilaterally—in all key areas of the arms limitation and reduction process.

In the Sphere of Strategic Offensive Arms

The START Treaty has been submitted to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet for ratification. The treaty ratification process has also begun in the United States.

Russia advocates that we should not rest on our laurels but, together with the United States, move forward at increasing speed along the road of cutting back excess military structures—above all, nuclear structures. We have already adopted a whole series of major unilateral measures as a development of the START Treaty. Around 600 strategic ballistic missiles have been stood down, a whole series of military programs to develop [sozdaniye] new types of strategic offensive arms have been halted, and measures have been taken to enhance strategic stability and predictability.

As you can see, the policy of setting a good example in relations between Russia and the United States in cutting nuclear arsenals is already producing real results, and it should be developed in every possible way.

Guided by this aim, we have made a decision about new initiatives designed to expedite the nuclear disarmament process. Moreover, I have sent to President G. Bush Russia's proposal on new, deep strategic offensive arms cuts.

As a result of our proposed cuts each side would be left with a total of 2,000-3,000 strategic nuclear weapons. In other words, current Russian and U.S. strategic arsenals would be reduced manifold.

I also intend to discuss in detail and in a constructive spirit questions of new deep cuts to strategic offensive arms at my coming Camp David meeting with President G. Bush.

In the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Sphere

We have already adopted, in parallel with the United States, major measures to cut tactical nuclear weapons too. The former USSR's weaponry of this kind is currently located on the territory of three states—Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine. In line with the agreement between the CIS states all tactical nuclear munitions will be moved to Russia by 1 July 1992.

Production of nuclear warheads for ground-launched tactical missiles, artillery shells, and nuclear landmines has been halted. Stockpiles of these tactical nuclear weapons will be eliminated.

I would also state that Russia is eliminating a third of its sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons and half of its nuclear warheads for surface-to-air missiles. We have also taken measures in this direction.

While gearing itself to the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, Russia—in addition to the measures already taken—will also be halving stocks of airborne tactical nuclear weapons.

In the Sphere of ABM Defense and Space

Russia reaffirms its commitment to the ABM Treaty, which is one effective constraint on the strategic arms race and an important factor in the maintenance of strategic stability.

While adhering to this position in principle, we are prepared to continue unprejudiced discussion of the U.S. proposal on limited nonnuclear ABM systems. Our final attitude to this idea will be determined by the extent to which it accords with the task of strengthening strategic stability in the conditions of deep cuts in strategic offensive arms.

I declare Russia's readiness, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States, to eliminate existing antisatellite systems and draw up an accord on a total ban on weapons specifically designed to destroy satellites.

In the Sphere of Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests and Banning the Production of Fissionable Materials for Weapons Purposes

Russia is resolutely in favor of a ban on all nuclear weapons tests. We remain true to the one-year moratorium on nuclear explosions announced in October 1991, and we hope that the other nuclear powers will also refrain from conducting nuclear tests. An atmosphere of mutual restraint would be conducive to the attainment of an accord on not holding such tests at all.

In the interests of ultimately resolving this task, we propose to the United States that bilateral stage-by-stage talks on further limitations on nuclear weapons tests be resumed.

Russia intends to continue to fulfill the program of halting the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Industrial reactors for the production of weapons-grade plutonium will be shut down by the year 2000, and some of them, on an accelerated time scale, as early as 1993. We reaffirm our proposal to the United States that agreement be reached on the verifiable cessation of production of fissionable [passhcheplyayushchiyesya] materials for weapons.

In the Sphere of Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Delivery

As the successor state to the USSR, Russia naturally reaffirms its commitments under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its commitments as depositary. We expect the accession to the treaty in the near future, as nonnuclear states, of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, as well as the other states belonging to the CIS.

Russia declares its full support for the activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and advocates the strengthening of the effectiveness of its guarantees.

We feel satisfaction that an understanding has been reached on creating a zone free from nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

We intend to take additional steps to ensure that exports from the USSR do not lead to the proliferation of means of mass destruction. It is from this viewpoint that we are currently working on questions of adopting the principle of "all-embracing IAEA guarantees" as a condition of our peaceful nuclear exports and officially acceding to the international regime of nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies as an equal participant. We support the efforts of the so-called "Australia group" for the monitoring of chemical exports.

We envisage the adoption of internal legislation regulating the export from Russia of "dual-purpose" materials, equipment, and technologies, which could be used to create nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missiles. We are also setting up an effective system of state monitoring of such exports. We will establish the closest cooperation and coordination among all the CIS member states on these aspects.

Russia supports the guiding principles of the weapons trade that were approved in London in October 1991 by the countries which are the main exporters of conventional weapons, and will adhere to them.

In the Sphere of Conventional Arms

The treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe has been submitted to the Russian parliament for ratification. An understanding exists with the other CIS member states to whose territory the treaty's provisions extend, that they will also ratify it.

Russia reaffirms its intention, in conjunction with the other CIS member states, to reduce the Armed Forces of the former Union by 700,000 men.

Russia attaches great significance both to the talks currently taking place in Vienna on personnel cuts and confidence-building measures, and to the new talks on security and cooperation in Europe, due to take place after the "Helsinki-2" conference. These new talks could become a permanent all-European forum for seeking approaches to the formation of a collective all-European security system.

Russia will seek to achieve an accord at talks with China concerning the reduction of armed forces and armaments in the border region.

Our decision not to conduct in 1992 large-scale exercises with the participation of more than 13,000 men, not only in the European part but also in the Asian part of CIS territory, will also be a substantial contribution to strengthening stability.

We also hope that it will prove possible in the very near future to sign an "open skies" treaty.

In the Sphere of Chemical Weapons

We are in favor of the speediest conclusion—as early as 1992—of a global convention on a chemical weapons ban which, while safely barring the path to the possession of chemical weapons, will not be detrimental to the legitimate economic interests of the participants.

Russia adheres to the agreement with the United States on the nonproduction and destruction of chemical weapons signed in 1990. However, the schedule it stipulated for the destruction of such weapons will require some adjustment.

All the chemical weapons of the former USSR are on the territory of Russia, and it takes on the responsibility for their destruction. We are drawing up a state program for their destruction and are open to cooperation with the United States and other interested countries on this matter.

In the Sphere of Biological Weapons

Russia is in favor of the strict implementation of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons and the creation on a multinational basis of a corresponding verification mechanism and the implementation of measures aimed at confidence and openness.

As a party to the 1972 Convention, Russia renounces that part of the reservations stipulated by the USSR to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Chemical and Bacteriological Methods relating to the possibility of retaliatory use of biological weapons.

In the Sphere of Defense Budgets

Russia will continue substantially to reduce its defense budget, giving it a social orientation.

In 1990-1991 expenditure on defense, at comparable prices, had already been reduced by 20 percent, including a 30-percent reduction in expenditure on purchases of arms and equipment.

In 1992 we intend to reduce military expenditure by a further 10 percent (at 1991 prices). The volume of arms production in the current year will be reduced by approximately half, compared with last year.

In the Sphere of Conversion of Military Production

Russia welcomes international cooperation in the sphere of conversion of military production, and will for its part encourage this through the creation of "most-favored status" and the establishment of tax concessions for relevant joint projects. Conversion will take place with the maximum possible benefit to the people.

Mr. Secretary General!

Those are the main avenues of Russia's policy in the sphere of arms reduction and disarmament. We are open to ideas and proposals from other states aimed at strengthening international peace and security. By joint efforts, lasting peace can and should be guaranteed.

Respectfully yours,

B. Yeltsin,
President of the Russian Federation.

ICBM 'Retargeting' Seen Increasing Tensions

*MK0202082092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Feb 92 p 2*

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov: "Retargeting Missiles: Good Intentions"]

[Text] There is no doubt that the Russian president's declaration that after 27 January our missiles will not be targeted against American cities is the product of a genuine desire to improve relations between the two powers—especially in such an important sphere as their strategic relations, which place both countries in a very special position vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

It is also worth bearing in mind, however, that the two states' strategic relationship is an extremely complex macrosystem of technology, economics and strategy. In the course of 40 years this system has acquired its own developmental dynamic and logic of mutual ties.

Though assuming the targeting of cities has ended, one can nevertheless conclude from the declaration that the territory of the United States remains exposed to attack; otherwise it would be necessary to say which country the missiles have been retargeted against. Most likely there is no such country. First of all, there are more than enough warheads to target all non-American objects worthy of attention (There are now more than 10,000 warheads on strategic offensive systems alone, that is, on missiles and

heavy bombers). Secondly, the rest of the world simply does not have that many targets whose destruction by strategic nuclear systems would be justified from a purely military point of view.

To target wide-open spaces or an ocean is absurd. Why retain these weapons at all in that case; it would be better to eliminate them all, with a first step being to take them off alert [boevoye dezhurstvo], remove their warheads, and store them away individually. If this is not done and the missiles remain in the active arsenal [v boevom sostave], then the other side will naturally assume the weapons are, as before, targeted against them—especially since it only takes several hours to retarget (that is, enter new flight instructions) even after targeting has ended. Therefore, control will not be enhanced by ending or changing targeting or by switching targeting from one object to another.

According to available information, strategic forces commanders have interpreted the president's declaration in their own way, and in general, quite logically. If the missiles remain in the active arsenal and on alert and are not retargeted against another state—but are also no longer targeted against American cities—that means they will keep other objects under threat of attack. In particular this means military bases, American missile launch sites, and command centers.

Is this really better than targeting cities? The fact is that the logic of strategic relations is a very stubborn thing. If you target missiles against the missile launch sites and command centers of another state, that means you are planning corresponding operations as well—strikes designed to destroy these targets. Otherwise, targeting them makes no sense. So if you target missiles and command centers, that means you are planning a preemptive strike.

Indeed, a retaliatory strike against a launch site is pointless; they will by definition be empty once they have launched their missiles against you in a first strike. This is precisely how the United States interprets the targeting of Russian missiles against its strategic forces.

If the interpretation of our strategic command takes hold, then the Russian president's declaration will hardly go down in history as a constructive initiative. The result would be that, while wishing to improve the strategic relationship of the two powers, the unintended result could be an added element of tension or, at best, uncertainty. This is why Washington has been slow to respond.

The idea of retargeting missiles from cities to military objects has been proposed before. Robert MacNamara during his service as secretary of defense formulated this idea in 1962 as the so-called "counterforce" strategy. Another defense secretary, James Schlesinger, declared essentially the same thing in 1973 in his "choice of targets" strategy. In both cases, both independent American specialists and Soviet experts interpreted these concepts as plans to launch a preemptive strike with the aim of disarming one's opponent while minimizing damage to oneself from his retaliatory strike.

It is exceptionally difficult to bring something new to this debate. But it is rather easy, by exerting an arbitrary influence on a very complex system through the best of motives, to provoke through the mechanism of mutual ties an end result opposite to that intended.

Major, Yeltsin Comment on Yeltsin Talks in London

PM0402120992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 1 Feb 92 First Edition p 6

[ITAR-TASS report: "News Conference Held by Yeltsin and Major"]

[Excerpts] Britain and Russia "have made progress toward building new relations." That was how British Prime Minister John Major described the completed 4-hour talks between the two countries' leaders.

Addressing an impromptu news conference outside the entrance to his residence, where the Russian-British meeting was held, he noted that both countries have always been interested in establishing closer relations, but that now "common values—a commitment to democracy, a free economy, peace, and stability" are adding new impetus to this. John Major stated that he was glad of the opportunity to welcome the arms control initiatives taken by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. "I expressed our resolute support for further steps toward reducing nuclear arsenals to ensure that nuclear deterrence exists at a much lower level and is based on the most stable systems," he said. "I assured him that we intend to maintain only minimum strategic deterrence forces which will threaten no one." [passage omitted]

John Major confirmed that Britain will help Russia eliminate the nuclear weapons which are due to be cut and will send a group of technical experts to Moscow to ascertain the vital requirements in this area.

John Major wound up by saying that he had invited President Yeltsin to make an official visit to Britain later this year. "I am delighted that this invitation has been accepted," he said.

"I have perhaps nothing to add to the 10 points which Mr. Major has expounded—about what we discussed today in our conversations in small and larger groups," said Boris Yeltsin. "I would only wish to note that Russia has at last cast off the communist shackles and embarked on a civilized path of development. It sees no other path. [passage omitted]

Answering journalist' questions, John Major emphasized, among other things, that he has no doubts whatsoever that Russia under Boris Yeltsin's leadership will continue the work in the disarmament sphere, particularly between the two superpowers. For his part, the president of the Russian Federation noted that he respects Britain's stance on the question of its deterrence forces. "We do not intend to discuss this topic, let alone inflate it in the mass media," he said. Speaking about the military doctrine which prevailed in the former USSR, Boris Yeltsin pointed out that it must be altered, and

"the targeting [napravleniye] of our missiles remaining after the cuts must also be correspondingly altered."

Yeltsin Speech to UN Security Council

PM0302110692 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Feb 92 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Text of Yeltsin speech delivered in New York on 31 January under the headline: "Ready To Continue Partnership: B.N. Yeltsin's Speech at the UN Security Council Session"]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Mr. Chairman!

Esteemed Security Council members!

Esteemed Mr. Secretary General! [passage omitted]

All of us carry a huge burden of mutual distrust. It is no secret that a most profound abyss has formed between the states that were until recently called the superpowers.

This abyss must be bridged. That is the wish of our peoples, that is the will of the presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

The new political situation in the world makes it possible not only to advance original ideas, but to make even the boldest of them practicable.

Our proposals are set forth in messages to UN Secretary General Mr. Butrus Butrus Ghali and U.S. President G. Bush.

Russia believes that the time has come to considerably reduce the presence of means of destruction on our planet.

I am convinced that together we are capable of making the principle of minimum defense sufficiency a fundamental law of life for states in the modern world.

Today there are real opportunities for:

- implementing deep cuts in strategic offensive arms and tactical nuclear weapons;
- resolutely moving toward significant limitations on nuclear testing and even its complete cessation;
- making ABM defense systems simpler and less costly and eliminating antisatellite systems;
- considerably reducing conventional arms and the strength of military contingents;
- ensuring practical implementation of international agreements on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons;
- enhancing the reliability of barriers to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The problem of experts engaged in the development and production of such weapons, including nuclear scientists, has recently become topical.

No country has the right to use their talents for political gain to the detriment of international security.

Russia is fully aware of its own responsibility and is taking steps to provide social protection for such experts.

At the same time we support the idea of creating international centers which could coordinate appropriate research and support the most promising areas of work.

I think the time has come to consider creating a global system for protection of the world community. It could be based on a reorientation of the U.S. strategic defense initiative (SDI) with the use of high technologies developed in Russia's defense complex.

We are ready to actively participate in the preparation and formation of an all-European collective security system, in particular at the Vienna talks and at the upcoming new talks on security and cooperation in Europe after Helsinki II.

Russia sees the United States, the West, and the countries of the East not as mere partners but as allies. This is a most important prerequisite for, I would say, a revolution in peaceful cooperation among the states of the civilized world.

We reject any subordination of foreign policy to ideological doctrines, any tendency to regard it as having an autonomous existence. Our principles are simple and clear: supremacy of democracy, human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, and morality.

I hope these things are also held dear by our partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. We support their earliest admission to the United Nations and believe that this will have a beneficial impact on the evolution of the Commonwealth itself.

The Commonwealth has been formed by the participating states on the basis of full equality and of their own free will; it rests on natural human ties among tens of millions of people.

Russia is fully aware of its responsibility for making the Commonwealth of Independent States a weighty factor for stability in the world.

This applies first and foremost to nuclear forces. The Commonwealth member states are united in the view that nuclear weapons are an integral part of the CIS strategic forces, which are subject to unified command and joint control.

Talks are now under way on questions of the future of the Armed Forces of the former Union. The main task is to carry out their transformation in a civilized manner and on a clearly defined treaty basis. [passage omitted]

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Commentary Notes SDI Technology Transfers

LD0102043992 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0300 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Commentary by Igor Ambrosov]

[Text] A summit meeting between the presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation will take place

today at Camp David, Maryland. Topping the agenda during their talks will, of course, be arms control. Of course, George Bush and Boris Yeltsin will discuss their recent initiatives. Among the new ideas contained in Boris Yeltsin's statement on Russian policy toward arms reductions and limitations, specialists are singling out the attitude to anti-missile defenses in space. As is known, the indefinite duration ABM treaty between the USSR and United States signed in 1972 assumed that neither side would strengthen its ability to counter the other's missiles. For a long time, a limited anti-missile defense was viewed by Soviet military experts as a safeguard against the temptation to deliver a preemptive nuclear strike. That is why the protests were so strong against the ill-famed SDI, or Strategic Defense Initiative, of President Reagan. How does the Russian leadership see this issue today? Igor Ambrosov comments:

[Ambrosov] You could write a thriller novel about the resistance by Soviet diplomatic and other establishments to Reagan's SDI, known colloquially as Star Wars—about how the Soviets broke off talks, how they would resume the talks after a break, how the Soviet position on linkage between SDI and 50 percent cuts in offensive weapons evolved, and so on. The Americans, however, having announced that they were beginning to put the program into effect, set about doing so. Only once was there a kind of outburst. In one of his speeches, about ten years ago, President Reagan stated that if the USSR agreed to the idea of SDI, then America would be ready to share the technology for forming an anti-missile shield, and that if everyone was well-defended then nobody would want to attack. But President Reagan was very quickly put right. He never took the idea of transferring American technology to the USSR any further.

But what is SDI? Simple: an anti-missile system with parts of it deployed in space. The United States has on many occasions said that strategic defense is a key element in its military policy. The space-based parts would be deployed when ready, if their deployment was economically efficacious. The United States used to persistently propose shifting completely away from the idea of nuclear deterrence and moving over to strategic defense, not only against each other but also against possibly reckless dictators or accidental launches. It looks as if Russia is beginning to lean towards this idea, and at the highest level. President Yeltsin's statement incorporated even joint development, joint creation and joint operation of a global defense system in place of SDI.

It is premature to predict events in this sphere. However, it is fairly unlikely that the United States will be quick to change its policy of not even allowing its closest NATO allies access to the most important SDI research results. So there is hardly any chance of the Americans changing their position after numerous announcements by Russian politicians about how we no longer see the United States as our enemy. There is much more to cooperation

in high technology than initially meets the eye. It is not only a matter of national security or political cooperation. It is also a matter of competitiveness of one's economy. It is much harder today to find points of contact between the United States' and Russia's economies and technological levels than to develop even the most complex of political decisions.

Need, Prospects for Cooperation With U.S. in Global Defense Viewed

*LD0102132592 Moscow TASS in English
1249 GMT 1 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Lebedev]

[Text] Washington February 1 TASS—In a WASHINGTON POST interview published today, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov did not exclude [that] the United States and the Commonwealth member states could become allies in future.

The commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States accompanies Russian President Boris Yeltsin in his trip to the U.S.

"We have some experience from World War II where we very successfully accomplished our mission," he recalled. "We must not be imprisoned by our old, unkind relationship."

Shaposhnikov emphasised the importance of the proposal to create a global defence system for the world community, which was put forward by Yeltsin at the summit of the UN Security Council. He said this system could be based on the re-oriented U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme and use technologies developed in Russia's defence sector.

Shaposhnikov said this proposal became possible thanks to "the new level of trust and confidence" between the U.S. and former Soviet republics.

Pointing out that roughly ten nations are gaining the capability to acquire and deliver nuclear weapons, Shaposhnikov called for collaboration between Russia and the U.S. to make sure that "no unauthorised employment of such weapons can be undertaken by any third country."

Shaposhnikov said that Washington had offered to assist in the transport of nuclear weapons to Russia from the Commonwealth states, but that Moscow had rejected the assistance as unnecessary, the WASHINGTON POST writes.

Shaposhnikov expressed concern that extensive Western involvement in the dismantling of the Soviet nuclear complex would compromise military secrets.

Shaposhnikov also said that steps were being taken in the Commonwealth to reduce arms exports to Iran and to ensure that military equipment does not leak to extremist states.

Yeltsin Comments on Arms Initiatives During U.S. Trip

New York Press Conference

*LD0102195392 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Feb 92*

[Report over video by correspondent V. Ilyashenko on news conference by Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin in the UN Grand Hall in New York on 31 January, including recorded "brief statement" by Yeltsin and responses to questions at the news conference; from the "Novosti" newscast presented by Pavel Kasparov]

[Text] [Kasparov] The political reverberations of the meetings which the Russian leader has held in the United States will have a very substantial effect on the international situation. Hence the extremely great interest which Boris Yeltsin's news conference in New York aroused when it took place yesterday following the end of the UN Security Council sitting.

[Ilyashenko] [Video shows Yeltsin news conference] The UN Grand Hall is crammed to overflowing. Hundreds of correspondent who have come to New York to cover the summit conference came to the Russian president's news conference. The world press displayed great interest in Yeltsin's address to the Security Council and in Russia's foreign policy initiatives. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin made a brief statement. He said, inter alia:

[Yeltsin] Today's sitting justified our expectations. The role of the United Nations and its ability to respond to the challenges of the time are growing under the influence of the profound changes in the world. I shall point out in particular the vigorously voiced support for the new approach to disarmament through counter-initiatives.

You have been able to familiarize yourselves with the statement by the president of Russia and the proposal by President Bush.

[Ilyashenko] The correspondents asked first of all about Yeltsin's proposal for setting up a global system for protecting the world community. Will Russia's participation in this costly programme not affect the country's economy?

[Yeltsin] No, I do not think so. In the first place, several years will be needed to work it out. Second, we need to engage the good brains of scientists—atomic and nuclear scientists, and space specialists—so that they do not leak away abroad, if you will excuse the expression, and do not spread, so to speak, nuclear weapons technology to other countries. If we give these 3,000 specialists work, if we give them work, then they will lose all desire to go off somewhere else.

[Ilyashenko] Many questions were put to the president on various aspects of Russia's program in the sphere of

nuclear disarmament and the domestic situation in the country. The Russian president was asked about the destiny of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

[Yeltsin] Everything has been withdrawn from Kazakhstan to the territory of Russia, and from Belarus to the territory of Russia; everything is being withdrawn from Ukraine, and will be withdrawn by 1 July this year, certainly.

[Ilyashenko] President Yeltsin's news conference lasted more than half an hour. Many U.S. television companies broadcast a direct relay of the news conference.

Questioned on Global Defense Proposal

LD0102054192 Moscow TASS in English
0538 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Excerpts] United Nations February 1 (ITAR-TASS)—At the close of the U.N. Security Council summit, President Boris Yeltsin of Russia gave a news conference on Friday [31 January]. He made the following statement:

"Ladies and gentlemen, today's summit has justified our expectations. The role and the ability of the United Nations to meet the challenges of the times grow under the impact of deep-going changes in the world. I can particularly point out a firmly-voiced support for the new approach to disarmament by means of reciprocal initiatives.

You had an opportunity to familiarise yourselves with the statement of the president of Russia and the proposals of President Bush. But the approach to stability and security is not the monopoly of Russia and the United States. We suggest that other big military powers also take this road.

In a final document adopted today the Security Council has laid emphasis on the observance of all obligations in the field of arms reduction and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia will consistently implement the accords reached both within the framework of cooperation with partners for the Commonwealth of Independent States and at international forums. [passage omitted]

The entire spectrum of matters concerning Russian-U.S. relations and our entire agenda, including preparations for a full-scale summit, are to be touched upon during a meeting with U.S. President George Bush on Saturday [1 February]."

Then the president of Russia answered questions.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent asked him to explain the essence of his proposal on the establishment of a global system for the protection of the world community. The president's opinion is that, firstly, Russia and the United States could pool efforts and work out a joint space-based global defence system at the level of scientists and designers at first.

Secondly, the making and activation of the system through the joint efforts of the United States and Russia and, possibly, other nuclear states. Thirdly, and most importantly, the joint operation of the system.

Should such a system come into being, there would be no antagonism between the two big powers "because in our military doctrine we no longer regard the United States as our potential adversary and want to be allies", Yeltsin said. With the existence of such a system and with its joint operation, submarine- and land-based nuclear weapons would be obviated altogether, he added.

In response to a question as to whether the programme would have an adverse effect on the Russian budget, the president answered in the negative. "Firstly, the development of such a system will take several years. Secondly, we need to engage the services of nuclear scientists and space experts so that they would not go abroad and would not proliferate the nuclear weapon technology to other countries. Several years will suffice for us to revitalise our economy."

At correspondents' request, President Yeltsin touched upon the question of the whereabouts of tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union at present.

"All nuclear weapons have been removed from Kazakhstan and Belarus to the territory of Russia. Nuclear weapons from Ukraine are to be removed before July 1, this year, and stored for subsequent elimination. As far as strategic nuclear weapons are concerned, they are now present in all the four above-mentioned states—in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine—in operational readiness," Yeltsin said.

Says Bush Finds Proposal 'Tempting'

LD0202140492 Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian 1335 GMT 2 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin today arrived back in Moscow after his visits to Britain, the United States, and Canada.

At Vnukovo Airport he told reporters that his visits involved a heavy workload and had been productive. Speaking of his meetings with U.S. President George Bush, Boris Yeltsin stressed that the principal outcome is the mutual understanding achieved. The Russian president also commented that aid to Russia, especially food deliveries, is expected to be increased following his contacts with Western leaders.

Asked by an ITAR-TASS correspondent whether the United States intends to drop SDI research in favor of a global security system in space, Boris Yeltsin replied that George Bush found his idea on setting up such a system "tempting." He stated that specific proposals in this regard are being drawn up by experts. In addition, Boris Yeltsin noted, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is to

arrive in Moscow in two weeks' time to discuss an entire range of disarmament issues, including a space-based security system.

Academics Comment on Yeltsin Global Defense Proposal

Early Warning Cooperation Seen

*OW0502032392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1917 GMT 4 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Boris Yeltsin of Russia has said in an IF [INTERFAX] interview that U.S. President George Bush called "enticing" his proposal to create a global space-based system to protect the world community. Andrey Kokoshin, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has been one of the leading developers of a system that is aimed at reorienting the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) using high technologies offered by the Russian defense complex. He said in an exclusive IF [INTERFAX] interview he viewed Mr Yeltsin's initiative as opening up an opportunity for cooperation in the development of an anti-missile warning system.

In Kokoshin's view, this work should begin from an exchange of information with the view to setting up a joint information clearing house. He says the objective is hard to achieve given the fact that similar systems have been developed in the USSR and in the United States "following internal priorities". In addition, old secrets will have to be revealed. The next stage may involve a joint work on specific elements of the system, including satellites and radars. Mr Kokoshin does not venture to discern further stages of the project implementation.

Once Russia and the United States ceased to be potential enemies, a conceptual foundation for strategic stability may be said to have been changed. Today, security and reliability of nuclear weapons but measured in terms of having no opportunity to use them is a major factor contributing to stability. At this junction, we should work to prevent accidental and unauthorized launches. Only this way a reliable protection from potential enemies of the new world order may be ensured.

With respect to the cost of the global protection system, Kokoshin said **joint efforts to develop an anti-missile warning system** would be much cheaper than similar efforts taken independently by either country. The issue of strike warheads, a cording to Kokoshin, requires a thorough examination given huge expenses involved. For us this consideration is of soecial significance, he added.

Russia Not 'Poor Relative'

*LD0602072292 Moscow TASS in English
1849 GMT 4 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS observer Nikolay Zheleznov]

[Text] Moscow February 4 (TASS)—The SDI, that once was feared by both Russians and Americans and took

lots of scientific efforts, seems to soon acquire a form of the "global monitoring" peaceful international project, believes academician and vice-president of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yevgeniy Velikhov.

In his opinion, it might be one of the first results of the Russian president's recent initiative put forward during his official U.S. visit.

Velikhov, who was member of Yeltsin's expert group during the visit, explained the monitoring means a space system of observation and watching of everything that happens on Earth.

Naturally, all the unexpectednesses, in case they threaten the security of this or that region, are a signal to the international community to interfere in the situation, no matter it is a ripening ecological catastrophe or data on the concentration of chemical or nuclear arms. [sentence as received]

Asked "to what extent the Russian and U.S. potentials united in the project are of equal worth", Velikhov admitted the Russian space technology's elementary basis is, certainly, inferior to that of the United States.

As for scientific and technological ideas and even some technologies, Russia is not "a poor relative", the academician said.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Russia To Negotiate With Baltics on CIS Forces Withdrawal

Russian Decree on Forces Jurisdiction

*PM0402140792 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Feb 92 First Edition p 2*

["Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Transfer of the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet to the Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation," carried under the "Official Section" rubric; dated 27 January 1992]

[Text] In view of the cessation of the existence of the USSR and for the purpose of maintaining stable control and ensuring the functioning of the Northwestern Group of Forces [NWGF] and the Baltic Fleet, I resolve: 1. To switch the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation under the command of the commander in chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces.

2. To lay down that the activity of the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet be financed out of the Russian Federation budget.

3. That a Russian Federation state delegation embark immediately on talks with delegations of the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic, and the Estonian Republic on questions of determining the status and arrangements for the withdrawal of troops and fleet forces from the territory of the aforementioned states.

4. To appoint Colonel General Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov the authorized representative of the Russian Federation on questions concerning the temporary residence in and withdrawal of troops and fleet forces from the territory of the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic, and the Estonian Republic.

5. The decree enters into force from the moment of its signature.

[Signed] Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

The Kremlin, Moscow

27 January 1992

Decree No 52

Withdrawal 'Now Under Control'

LD0302104592 Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian 2155 GMT 2 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb (TASS)—The process of withdrawing troops of the former Soviet Union from the Baltic countries is now under control. This is how Sergey Shakh-ray, Russian Federation Government deputy chairman and state adviser for legal matters, defined the main result of the three-day trip by a Russian delegation to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The delegation leader gave an interview to journalists on the evening of 2 February at the airport on his return to Moscow.

According to Sergey Shakh-ray, there is a fundamental difference between the accords reached and the decisions of the former Soviet leadership. There is no final date for troop withdrawal in any one single document. He pointed out that in the case of Eastern Europe these dates were frequently made up. As a result, servicemen in Russia found themselves unprotected. However, in the course of the present meetings, approximately 10 factors were formulated that affect the speed of withdrawal. Experts are to deal with them.

The Russian delegation head stated that those units that will be withdrawn from Lithuania in February and from Latvia in March, and where they will be quartered, has already been determined. In Estonia's case, a specific month for the start of troop withdrawals has not yet been fixed. According to Sergey Shakh-ray, the government crisis in that republic has resulted in it not having a delegation with appropriate powers. Instead of negotiations, an exchange of opinions was held with the top leadership. It is planned to hold a meeting of state delegations from Russia and Estonia at the end of February or the beginning of March.

Sergey Shakh-ray stressed that it is clearly indicated in the documents that any serviceman of the former USSR is under the protection of Russian law. The Russian side assumes the obligations of observing the laws of the states of residency, but these agreements will take precedence over national legislation. In the event of a conflict, as in the case of Latvia and Estonia, which have announced the nationalization of military property of

the former USSR, it is proposed "to reach a civilized agreement on what will be ceded or sold to the republics and what will be withdrawn." At the same time, the parties will refrain from unilateral acts.

"Far be it from me to say that everything has been resolved, but standpoints have been determined and the foundations for further work are there," Sergey Shakh-ray concluded.

Withdrawal To Begin Feb, Mar

OW0202182392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1645 GMT 2 Feb 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Talks began in Tallinn on Sunday [2 February] between the state delegations of Russia and Estonia on matters related to the temporary presence in Estonia of former Soviet troops that are now under Russia's jurisdiction, and on their withdrawal. The Russian delegation is headed by Vice Premier Sergey Shakh-ray.

Experts and diplomats from the Russian delegation note that the line taken by Estonia is hinged on a constructive approach to the full range of military and related political issues being discussed. They have said in particular that the Estonian side has expressed readiness to provide funds for construction of military camps for the troops being pulled out.

The day before, Russian negotiators had held talks in Riga with a Latvian delegation. The two sides noted in a final communique that the armed forces of former USSR stationed on the territory of Latvia would from now on be treated "as foreign armed forces being withdrawn from the territory of another sovereign state".

The pullout of troops from Latvia is scheduled to begin in March 1992. The delegations reached agreement that the time, sequence and stages of the pullout would be chosen in such a way as to ensure Latvia's and Russia's national security, as well as guarantee social protection of servicemen and their families. It has been decided that matters related to social protection of retired servicemen will be addressed as soon as possible at the negotiating table.

Similar understandings have been reached by Russia with Lithuania. The pullout of troops from the territory of that republic is to begin as early as February.

Admiral Kapitanets on Talks

PM0502165592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Feb 92 p 3

[Report by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh, Captain First Rank A. Pilipchuk, and Captain Second Rank V. Urban: "Troop Withdrawal: Now from Baltic Countries"]

[Excerpts] A Russian state delegation headed by Sergey Shakh-ray, deputy chairman of the government and state

counselor for legal policy, visited Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn 31 January through 2 February. [passage omitted]

Admiral of the Fleet Ivan Kapitanets, first deputy commander of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Navy, who participated in the meetings, told KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent:

"In its work the Russian Federation delegation proceeded, above all, from the premise that the troops of the Northwest Group of Forces (the former Baltic Military District) and the forces of the Baltic Fleet stationed on the territory of the Baltic states have been placed under Russia's jurisdiction. In this connection the Russian delegation took a firm stand on the rights proclaimed by the Baltic states to ownership of the Army and Navy in that region. The Russian delegation is prepared to examine property claims against the military only for the period prior to 1940. The Russian Government delegation examined questions of the withdrawal of the group's troops and the Fleet's forces from the Baltic states' territory in the context of creating conditions for their relocation. This will be carried out as the troops are provided with conditions for amenities at the new place, for the construction of housing and sociocultural and domestic projects, and for the resolution of problems of servicemen's social protection. The question of supplying food and consumer goods to the servicemen temporarily stationed on the territory of sovereign states was touched upon during the talks." [passage omitted]

Deputy Premier Shakhray News Conference

LD0402192992 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Feb 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Vice Premier Shakhray reported today on the results of his trip to the Baltic states. It is the most serious topic for the near future. The army deployed in the Baltic states is now Russian, numbering 40,000 officers and warrant officers and also members of their families.

[Correspondent G. Fadeyeva] A news conference was given today at the Russian Government press center by Vice Premier Shakhray on the results of his trip to the Baltic countries where he conducted talks on the withdrawal of troops of the former USSR. According to preliminary calculations, this action will cost 600 billion rubles.

[Begin Shakhray recording] The position of the Russian delegation was as follows: As far as the beginning of the withdrawal is concerned, everything is very simple, but the problem of the conclusion of the withdrawal was one of the issues under discussion. We did not want to repeat the experience of the former Soviet leadership. [end recording]

[Fadeyeva] The final date for the troops' withdrawal will be fixed after thoroughly analyzing such factors as the

need to preserve peace and stability in Europe, guarantees for social protection, the throughput of transport, and also the nonuniform nature of the troops to be withdrawn. A question arose with regard to who should pay compensation and to whom—the Baltic states to Russia for property to be left behind, or Russia to the Baltic states for the deployment of troops. It was decided that the withdrawal will be financed from the budget of the Russian Federation. However, this issue will be tackled by taking into account the entire complex of property issues.

Regarding today's government session, to which journalists were not admitted, the vice premier answered that it was a preparation for a meeting of the Commonwealth countries which is set for 14 February. Issues relating to cooperation with Supreme Soviet committees were also discussed.

Troops Withdrawal Timetable Given

LD0402164792 Moscow TASS in English
1555 GMT 4 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksandras Budris and Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow February 4 TASS—The withdrawal of troops of the former Soviet Union from Lithuania will begin in February, and from Latvia—in March, Russian Cabinet Vice Premier and State Adviser on Legal Policy Sergey Shakhray told today's news conference at the Russian Government.

Shakhray headed the Russian delegation to the negotiations held between January 31 and February 2 in the Baltic capitals.

The vice premier did not exclude that in March troops may be also withdrawn from Estonia after holding corresponding negotiations with the Estonian side.

He said the Russian delegation was guided by the Russian president's decree that the armed forces of the former Soviet Union, stationed in the Baltic states, are Russian and stay under Russian protection and jurisdiction.

The Russian side takes an obligation to observe laws of the host-states, however, proceeds from the fact the reached agreements will dominate national legislations of the sides to the agreement. [sentence as received]

Shakhray said it was stressed at the negotiations Russia takes obligations on social guarantees and payment of pensions to former servicemen currently residing in the three Baltic states.

NWGF Commander To Represent Russia

LD0402160192 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1500 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Text] The decree issued on 27 January by Boris Yeltsin authorizes Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, commander of the Northwest Group of Forces [NWGF], to deal on behalf of the Russian Federation with the issues

of the temporary presence and their withdrawal of troops of the former USSR in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Col. Gen. Mironov made a statement to this effect today in Riga at a news conference organized for Latvian and foreign journalists. This is reported by BALTIJA-ETA.

A specific schedule for the withdrawal of troops, a procedure for the withdrawal, and the troops' status in the Baltics will be determined by agreements. When questioned about the size of the troops of the former USSR stationed in Latvia [passage indistinct]

According to the colonel general, the final deadline for the withdrawal of the troops depends on several factors. One of those is ensuring social protection for the military of the former USSR and for military pensioners. It was emphasized that the issues of the withdrawal of the Armed Forces will be resolved through strict observance of and respect for the state independence and sovereignty of the Baltic states. [passage indistinct]

Experts To Meet To Start Drafting Treaty

OW0502164792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1414 GMT 5 Feb 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Groups of experts from the chief command of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces and the Baltic states will meet February 10 to start drafting a treaty between Russia, on the one hand, and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, on the other, on the legal status and schedule of the withdrawal of troops of the former USSR, chief command of the CIS Armed Forces has told BALTFAX.

The chief command of the CIS Armed Forces is going to confirm officially the strength and sites where troops are deployed on the territory of the Baltic states by the time the agreements are to be signed. The command of the Armed Forces of the former USSR will coordinate plans for exercises and redeployments with the Baltic authorities and pledge not to interfere in their internal affairs and to observe the laws of the host country.

The CIS military command says that the future of movable and fixed assets of the armed forces of the dissolved USSR is going to be one of the most serious controversies. Military experts believe that the Baltic states cannot demand disinterested hand-over of that property, because it has been built with efforts by many republics of the former USSR. Under international law, that property is should be distributed proportionately.

Experts believe that Russia and the Baltic countries could include in the draft agreement the pledge to give servicemen and their families social, economic and political guarantees and freedoms. For instance the Baltic states could undertake to count the time of Army service on their territory as part of the residence qualification necessary to apply for the host country's citizenship and to pay servicemen certain sums in local currency.

Russian-Lithuanian Talks on Troop Withdrawal

Communique Issued

LD0102103792 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0828 GMT 1 Feb 92

[Text] Vilnius, 1 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—A communique on the working meeting of state delegations from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Lithuania has been circulated here. It says:

In accordance with an agreement reached at a working meeting between Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, a working meeting was held in Vilnius on 31 January 1992 between a state delegation from the Russian Federation, led by Sergey Shakhrai, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government and state counsellor for legal affairs, and a state delegation from the Republic of Lithuania, led by Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. A range of issues was discussed concerning the withdrawal from Lithuania of units of the Armed Forces of the former USSR, which are under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

In the course of a sincere and constructive dialogue, the sides confirmed their determination to develop good-neighborly and mutually beneficial relations with equal rights between the Russian Federation and the Lithuanian Republic in accordance with the principles of UN regulations and other generally recognized norms of international rights, strictly following the obligations taken within the CSCE framework, and in accordance with statutes of the treaty on the foundations of interstate relations between the Russian Federation and the Lithuanian Republic. The sides stressed that the ratification of this treaty raises the relations between the two states to a qualitatively new level and lays the international legal foundation for further interstate talks on military, political, economic, humanitarian, and other issues under consideration. It also creates good preconditions for Russian and Lithuanian constructive participation in the further development of the pan-European process and for the strengthening of stability and cooperation in Europe and the world.

The Russian delegation stressed that the troop withdrawal issues will be tackled with respect for the independence and state sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania and with strict observance of its laws and the agreements between the parties. The Lithuanian side expressed readiness to respect the interests of the Russian Federation related to the troop withdrawal from the territory of Lithuania.

The parties arranged to embark without delay on drawing up an agreement on the orderly withdrawal of the troops, which will define the timeframe and procedures for the withdrawal and the legal position in the transitional period up to the point of withdrawal. The parties agreed to regard the present meeting as the beginning of negotiations on drawing up that agreement.

The parties noted the existence of factors influencing the duration and timetable of the troop withdrawal, including the factors influencing the security of the Republic of Lithuania and the social protection of the servicemen. The sides agreed to take these factors into account when considering the issues involved with the troop withdrawal. The parties came to an understanding that the withdrawal from Lithuania of troops under Russian jurisdiction will contribute toward ensuring security and strategic stability on the European continent and the world.

Agreement was reached on the start of the withdrawal of military subunits from the territory of the Lithuanian Republic in February 1992.

Agreement of the sides on the solution of the most acute issues connected with efficiently supplying the military units on the territory of Lithuania was confirmed.

The sides intend to discuss terms for the handing over by the Russian Federation of a certain quantity and certain kinds of weapons, military hardware, and ammunition in order to equip the Lithuanian Republic's subunits for the protection of the country.

The sides agreed that they would define an inspection procedure, appoint inspectors, and carry out inspections—on a bilateral basis—of facilities on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic occupied by the troops being withdrawn.

The sides agreed on the setting up of expert groups needed to prepare an agreement and arranged that these groups would start work in Vilnius on 10 February 1992.

The communique was signed by Sergey Shakhray and Ceslovas Stankevicius.

Delegation Leaders Comment

*LD0102105992 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 1 Feb 92*

[Text] A meeting between the state delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Lithuania on the withdrawal of the units of the former Soviet Army, now under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, ended last night at Draugyste Hotel in Vilnius. Correspondent Zenonas Miksys reports:

[Begin recording] [Miksys] The greatest possible patience at Draugyste Hotel's conference hall, where this important meeting between the two delegations took place, was demonstrated by Lithuanian and Russian journalists. We waited at the door for more than eight hours. Commanders of the Northwestern Army Group, commanders of the Baltic Fleet, and advisers and experts, accompanied by aides-de-camp, long ago said goodbye, but we waited and waited. One, two, three, four breaks, the editing of the final communique, corrections, again to the computer, again corrections—all this took many hours. However, the promised and expected news conference took place, although improvised and brief.

Audrius Azubalis, press attache of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, presented the heads of the delegations: Sergey Shakhray, deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and state adviser on legal policy; and Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

[Shakhray, in Russian] We have carried out very prolonged work, but the length was caused not by the number of problems or the difficulty of overcoming them, but by the fact that we quickly elucidated the political stands of the sides and switched to concrete tasks. We worked so well on these aspects that we decided to prolong this process [word indistinct]. Today is 1 February, the start of the month that figures in our communique. We stated that this date is the beginning of the process of the withdrawal of the Army under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. We proceed from the fact that this will be a contribution by our states to the cause of European security and strategic stability. The most important thing, as we see it, is that we demonstrated once again that we can and want to reach an agreement.

[Stankevicius, in Russian] Journalists had to wait for a long time until we prepared the text of the communique. Unfortunately, we cannot produce it; it is being typed. You will be able to obtain it later and see the problems we discussed and the principal clauses we stated in the communique. I would like to stress that we agreed that today's meeting is the beginning of the common work of our delegations on the future agreement on the withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Union which are now under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Such an agreement will be prepared and signed. We think that the solution of the issue concerning the troop withdrawal from our territory will serve the common cause of security in Europe and the world. I also evaluate as important the decision we reached that the beginning of the withdrawal of troops from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania will be in February of this year; that is, the month that starts today. Other important evaluations and principles in the opinion of both delegations, and the outlined solutions of the problems, are also stated in the communique. Speaking for myself and our delegation, today's work was useful and represents a good start to the solution of this problem.

[Shakhray] I would like to add a few words. We agreed that the experts of our delegations will start work on 10 February on the concrete text of the agreement. In my opinion, we have defined an important clause noting that there are objective factors influencing the speed of the solution of the withdrawal problem. There are factors that can speed up the solution of the withdrawal problems. We also recorded these. One is ensuring the security of the Lithuanian state. Unfortunately, there are also factors delaying the solution of these processes. One of these is the solution of social problems. We found an understanding to seek an agreement in this sphere.

[Stankevicius] We think that today we added a small step to the first step made in the meeting between Mr. Landsbergis and President Yeltsin.

[Unidentified speaker] Now one question each. To the guest at first [words indistinct] the withdrawal of troops—is it [words indistinct] February?

[Shakhray] It is February.

[Question indistinct]

[Shakhray] This problem was discussed. We confirmed that we will seek and will find. We talked about it. There are [word indistinct] that the withdrawal of troops from the capital is an important aspect of solving this problem.

[Stankevicius] We had in mind that the communique signed by Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Landsbergis states the priority of the withdrawal of troops from the capital. [sentence indistinct]

[Question indistinct]

[Shakhray] We endeavor to build law-abiding states; therefore, we discussed only what we could discuss. Unfortunately, border troops are not now under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. As you know, there is an agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States. We have raised this problem and we are going to solve it during negotiations. At present we did not discuss any concrete [word indistinct] in this issue.

[Question indistinct]

[Shakhray] No date was mentioned. We consider that on 10 February the experts will meet and will discuss the date.

[Question indistinct]

[Shakhray] [passage indistinct] It is too early to speak about the obligations of the Lithuanian and the Russian sides. [passage indistinct]

[Stankevicius] [passage indistinct] The Lithuanian side has no obligations in the financing or any other problems of the troop withdrawal. However, if it is necessary, for instance, to include Lithuanian building organizations to implement these problems, we will examine these issues, such as the question of some contract work.

[Unidentified speaker] Thank you for your replies. Thank you for your questions.

[Miksys, in Lithuanian] It was 0145 when the heads of the Russian and Lithuanian delegations signed a communique on the working meeting of the delegations in Vilnius. This morning the Russian Federation delegation left, on the same mission, for Riga, the capital of the Republic of Latvia. [end recording]

Latvia, Russia Issue Communique on Troop Talks

*LD0202190292 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 0600 GMT 2 Feb 92*

[Communique on talks between the state delegations of the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Latvia, signed in Riga on 1 February—read by announcer]

[Text] In accordance with a prior agreement, talks took place in Riga between the state delegations of the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation on 1 February 1992. The delegations were led by Latvian Minister of State Janis Dinevics, and Sergey Shakhray, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government and state counsellor on legislative questions. A range of questions was discussed pertaining to the complete withdrawal of units of the former USSR Armed Forces, under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, from the territory of the Republic of Latvia.

During the talks the two sides expressed their resolution to develop equal and mutually beneficial neighborly relations between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation, corresponding to the principles of the UN statutes and other norms generally acknowledged in international relations; to observe strictly the obligations incumbent on them in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the corresponding conclusions reached on the bases for interstate relations in the treaty between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation.

The two sides affirmed their readiness to settle the complex of all military-political, economic, humanitarian, and other questions, bearing in mind that mutual agreement on these questions will be realized in conjunction with measures aimed at security and confidence in Europe, and the constructive cooperation of Latvia and Russia in the future development of the European process. The delegation of the Russian Federation stressed that the question of the Armed Forces' withdrawal will be settled while observing the independence and state sovereignty of the Republic of Latvia, as well as its laws and the treaties of both sides. The Latvian delegation expressed its readiness to observe the interests of the Russian Federation connected with the withdrawal of the Armed Forces from the territory of Latvia. Moreover, the two sides agreed that the Armed Forces are to be regarded as foreign military forces which are to be withdrawn from the territory of another sovereign state.

Agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Armed Forces stationed on the territory of the Republic of Latvia starting from March 1992, without increasing their numerical composition. The sides agreed that the talks that had taken place are to be regarded as a commencement of the work on a treaty between the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation on the stipulations, schedules, and order for the planned withdrawal of the Armed Forces and Navy from the territory of Latvia, and the regulation of relations during this period.

The two sides discussed the principles to be observed in the formation of this treaty. They agreed that the schedule, order, and phases of the withdrawal are to be related to a series of objective factors: First, those such as the interests of the national security of Latvia and Russia, as well as the guarantees of social protection of military personnel and their family members. The two sides agreed that the social protection of pensioners in the Armed Forces are to be regulated in talks in the near future.

The two sides agreed to refrain from unilateral uncoordinated action during the period of withdrawal of the Armed Forces. The two sides agreed on the formation of a working group of experts for the preparation of the mentioned draft treaty; the delegations may discuss this in the nearest future.

The Russian side recognizes the right of the Republic of Latvia to property, to buildings and structures erected up to 17 June 1940 and currently in use by the Armed Forces. Agreement was reached that the Russian side will regularly inform the Latvian side on the numerical composition of the Armed Forces stationed on the territory of the Republic of Latvia. The two sides' agreement was affirmed on the operative settlement of those most urgent questions connected with provisions for the Armed Forces stationed on the territory of Latvia, as well as the necessity for discussing the principles of mutual accounting. The two sides agreed that they will determine a procedure for inspection work: Inspectors will be designated, and on the basis of mutual agreement, they will conduct an inspection at sites occupied by forces to be withdrawn from the territory of Latvia.

Agreement was reached that the two sides will cooperate on questions of environmental protection. The scale of the environmental losses incurred by the forces' activity is to be determined by mutually agreed methods. The two sides intend to discuss the stipulations on the basis of which the Russian Federation will hand over to the Republic of Latvia a specific amount and form of arms, military equipment, and munitions.

The two sides also discussed the question of opening an embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Latvia.

The communique was signed in the name of the Republic of Latvia by Janis Dinevics and in that of Russia by Sergey Shakh-ray.

Russian-Estonian Troop Withdrawal Negotiations Begin

Initial Information Given

*LD0202174392 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian
1341 GMT 2 Feb 92*

[Text] We have an urgent telephone call from Tallinn. Talks were held there today between Russian and Estonian delegations on the subject of the withdrawal of the

army subunits of the former Soviet Union from Estonia. Here is our correspondent Heimar Lenk on the line from Tallinn:

[Lenk] Hello there. Good day. Compared with similar talks in Lithuania and Latvia, the Tallinn talks have proved briefer given that the new government in Estonia has not yet been fully able to appoint its delegation. Today the delegations were headed on the Estonian side by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lennart Meri, and on the Russian by Vice Premier Sergey Shakh-ray.

The principles governing the approach to the issue are the same as the Russian delegation applied in Lithuania and Latvia, Vice Premier Shakh-ray told journalists. He continued: We are willing to seek a way out of the existing situation and to tackle the question of the pull-out of Armed Forces on a planned and organized basis, while observing all the requirements without which such a withdrawal would be dangerous. There is the security of the Estonian Republic [words indistinct]. There is the security of the Russian Federation. There is the issue of the social protection of servicemen. There is the social protection of former servicemen. There is the problem of providing proper conditions for servicemen. And also, detailed stock needs to be taken of various military installations.

We set out the positions of each republic, Vice Premier Shakh-ray said, and agreed that experts would start work without delay. After all, a state on whose territory there are very large contingents of armed forces belonging to another state cannot feel safe and secure.

It was agreed today that the process will start in the near future. Specific aspects relating to the start of the withdrawal will be agreed at expert level and confirmed at the level of political leaders. That is the initial information I have.

Army Property Claimed

*OW0202182892 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1645 GMT 2 Feb 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] During talks with Russia, Estonia is going to demand that the troops which are withdrawn leave behind all their real and movable property, including light recoilless weapons. Estonia also lays claim to some of the vessels of the Baltic Fleet, although so far these claims have not been presented formally. This is what has been disclosed by Mr Toomas Puura, head of the State Chancery's department for defence matters, in an interview to a BALTFAX correspondent. He said that this property is needed by Estonia's military. The law on defence service has introduced compulsory military service in the republic. Mr Puura estimates that by the end of the year, 2,000 Estonians will be serving in various army units and as border guards.

Mr Puura also noted that the ex-Soviet servicemen currently stationed in Estonia abide by the republic's

legislation, and their commanding officers [words indistinct] relations with local civilian authorities. According to Estonia's data, around 23,000 servicemen that have recently come under Russia's jurisdiction are now stationed on the republic's territory, whereas last August there were 36,000 Soviet officers and non-commissioned personnel there. This means that the pullout has already begun, Mr Puura stressed. Estonia is currently worried when it will end.

Consensus Reached

LD0202214992 Moscow TASS in English
2128 GMT 2 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandra Budris]

[Text] Tallinn February 3 [dateline as received]—Russia and Estonia have reached a consensus about the need for prompt decision at intergovernmental level and through embassies of acute problems connected with the withdrawal of Armed Forces of the former USSR from the Estonian Republic.

This is said in a press release issued in Tallinn on Sunday [2 February] about a meeting of a state delegation of the Russian Federation with Estonian leaders.

The delegation headed by Sergey Shakhrai, deputy chairman of the Russian Government and state adviser for legal matters, met with president of the Estonian parliament Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Government Tiit Vahi, Chairman of the Estonian Supreme Council Julo Nurgis and Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri.

A range of questions related to the withdrawal from the Estonian territory of forces of the former USSR that are under jurisdiction of the Russian Federation was discussed at the meeting.

The press release says the Russian side emphasised that questions of armed forces withdrawal will be decided with full respect for independence and state sovereignty of the Estonian Republic, strict observance of its laws and of agreements between Russia and Estonia. In its turn, the Estonian side confirmed understanding for interests of the Russian Federation involved in the withdrawal of armed forces from the Estonian territory.

The sides discussed a number of factors influencing troop withdrawal, including the strengthening of stability in Northern Europe, ensurance of the interests of national security of Russia and Estonia, as well as the need for social protection for servicemen and their families.

The striving to keep from uncoordinated unilateral actions connected with troop withdrawal was also confirmed. The sides agreed to form groups of experts to draft an appropriate agreement.

The sides discussed matters of opening the embassy of the Russian Federation in the Estonian Republic.

Russian Delegation Arrives in Bonn for Troop Talks

LD0302154292 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1355 GMT 3 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Volnukhin]

[Text] Bonn, 3 Feb (TASS)—A Russian Government delegation headed by Colonel General Pavel Grachev, chairman of an interdepartmental commission of the Russian Federation [mezhvedomstvennaya komissiya Rossiskaya Federatsiya], first deputy commander in chief of the Commonwealth Armed Forces, and chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Defense Issues, arrived here today at the invitation of the German Government. The delegation is composed of Yevgenniy Arapov, chairman of the state economic commission under the president of the Russian Federation [gosudarstvennaya ekonomicheskaya komissiya pri presidente Rossiskoy Federatsii] and a minister of the Russian Federation; Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces; and other officials.

On 3-5 February, the Russian delegation will hold talks with leading members of the German Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, and Economics. The discussion of financial, social, economic, legal, and other aspects of the temporary stay and withdrawal from Germany of the Western Group of Forces will occupy a central place in these talks.

CFE Treaty Agenda Based on CIS Emergence

LD0602030592 Moscow TASS in English
1749 GMT 5 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna February 5 (ITAR-TASS)—The agenda of a meeting of the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)—the main instrument for the enactment of the treaty—dealt with questions of how to bring the CFE treaty into force most quickly and effectively and adapt it to new political realities taking shape in Europe following the emergence of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The JCG members positively evaluate the fact that consultations are now being held within the CIS framework on the apportionment of responsibility for the observance of the CFE treaty provisions in the form in which they were stipulated for the Soviet Union.

The very subject of consultations belongs exclusively to the competence of the respective CIS member-states. However, the informing of the other parties to the CFE treaty on the state of affairs during the consultations by using the channel of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council is viewed as a political goodwill gesture which is meant to build confidence still further.

As far as Russia is concerned, she takes the necessary steps towards bringing the CFE treaty into force,

Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, leader of the Russian Federation delegation to the JCG told ITAR- TASS. Preparations for the ratification of the treaty are in full progress in the Russian parliament, he added.

Russia intends to steer matters towards the observance of all Soviet obligations under the CFE treaty, Kulebyakin said. This applies to both the Russian Federation's direct responsibility for the obligations that will be assigned to it by internal accords within the CIS and to a general vision of the most optimum ways to resolve the CFE problems arising in view of the forthcoming accession of new states to it, he added.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Details on Semipalatinsk Test Range Disclosed

LD0402154892 Moscow TASS in English
1303 GMT 4 Feb 92

[By KAZTAG correspondent Konstantin Borodinov]

[Text] Alma-Ata February 4 TASS—For the first time in the history of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range in Kazakhstan, military men have disclosed material concerning tests and the radiation load to which the population and the environment have been exposed.

Professor Aytkhozha Bigaliyev, head of the ecology department at Kazakhstan's State University, writes in today's issue of the youth newspaper EXPRESS that the no longer classified materials make it possible to get a clear idea about the consequences of nuclear tests and make a radium-ecological map of areas surrounding the test range.

Bigaliyev worked in the State Commission set up by the Kazakh Cabinet of Ministers.

In his view, test range employees are prepared to cooperate with scientists from Kazakhstan and Russia. They intend to supply to the latter a laboratory and equipment. Bigaliyev emphasised everything should be done to prevent specialists at this nuclear centre from leaving Kazakhstan.

Arms Experts on 'Cracked' Nuclear Shield

PM0402112492 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Feb 92 p 3

[Report by K. Belyaninov incorporating interviews with Boris Gorbachev, former chief of nuclear weapons design department, and unidentified designer: "Dropping a Bombshell"]

[Text] As it happens, to this day we do not know what to do with the Tsar-Cannon [16th century gun, never fired, now on display in the Kremlin], although it is 500 years since they imposed a moratorium on testing it.

In the old days everything was simple. The country rolled smoothly on its way from one labor achievement to the next, and even nuclear explosions were used as a

kind of educational visual aid. In 1949, for instance, when the Soviet Union had only just begun to test weapons in the steppes near Semipalatinsk, teachers at nearby schools used to take the children outside, point to the mushroom cloud on the horizon, and say: "Look, children, that's where they are forging a secure shield for our Motherland."

They were forging quite a big shield, too. In the last 40 years, according to American figures, 818 explosions were carried out at two test ranges alone—the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya ranges; the number of nuclear charges is believed to be in hundreds of thousands, and as for secret cities engaged solely in weapons production, as many as 87 were built.

"The situation our nuclear arsenal is in now is frankly disastrous," claims Boris Gorbachev, who worked for more than 25 years as chief of a design department for the development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. "Whereas formerly we could at least maintain our munitions at a level dictated by the country's and people's security, now this is almost impossible. The weapons improvement program has been wound up and test ranges closed, and that means that production has halted and thousands of specialists will be out of work. Back in 1986 the country's only nuclear research centers—the institutes of theoretical and experimental physics—were deprived of centralized food supplies, then budget finance was cut by a third, and recently they were transferred entirely to market relations 'within the framework of conversion'! But a nuclear production facility is not a plant manufacturing warplanes which in principle could produce vacuum cleaners as well. We have nothing to offer except weapons, and much as you might like to, you cannot barter them for meat. Therefore you have to destroy everything that has been built up over the decades, and then you can start from scratch making baby carriages. As a result of all these decisions irreplaceable experts are leaving the facilities."

At the very beginning of perestroika it immediately became clear that such an extensive nuclear shield was not really appropriate to the officially declared peaceful aspirations of the new leadership. Then a one-year moratorium was imposed on all weapons tests and world public opinion was listened to keenly.

True, the public showed no particular enthusiasm, and Richard Perle, then U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, even went so far as to observe that "the development of weapons systems that are really safe in storage is impossible without nuclear tests."

"The problem of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is by no means exhausted with the declaration of a moratorium, the closure of test ranges, and the creation of nuclear-free zones. We announced to the whole world our plans for the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons, but nothing is being done in this direction, and in the context of the loss of irreplaceable experts, in a year or two this problem will be totally insoluble," a designer

who wishes to remain anonymous believes. "You simply cannot find people who possess sufficient experience and knowledge. A nuclear bomb is not a tank that you can calmly mothball and dump somewhere in the steppes. A large quantity of radioactive components and the elements in them have a life of their own, giving off very powerful radiation, from which, incidentally, we have yet to learn to protect ourselves.

"Judge for yourself. In order to neutralize a nuclear weapon, first you have to remove the radioactive materials, and only then can you blow up the very powerful explosive materials. One part of a weapon, for instance, is a small ampoule in which, with the passage of time, the pressure of radioactive gas increases. The ampoule is hermetically sealed, but even so its durability is limited.

"It has to be opened and destroyed without allowing a sudden discharge of gases and contamination of the area. This can only be done by those who manufactured the article and those who can make the necessary equipment—designers and technologists. In all our centers there are not more than 500 such experts. Now they are leaving too. And if you take into account that the number of these ampoules is believed to be in tens of thousands, and they are scattered around naval and army units, bases, and dumps throughout the country's territory, it becomes quite clear that in the very near future hundreds of 'Chernobyls,' big and small, can be expected."

The nuclear shield that was forged so zealously over more than 40 years has turned out to be well and truly cracked. The state's technical and scientific potential dictated its own terms, and the weapons, which at one time met the very highest criteria, are now approaching the critical point. It has been a kind of historical tradition for our state not to pay too much attention to people's safety. The radiation levels that exist on Soviet submarines, for instance, are deemed unanimously by U.S. experts to be unacceptable for the health of the crew.

Meanwhile, at a session of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee back in May 1986, it was stated that "thanks to the program of perfecting and testing nuclear weapons, several thousand fewer nuclear weapons are now stored in U.S. arsenals than in 1960, their total yield adds up to one-fourth of what it was 30 years ago, and the safety level has increased several times over...."

[Unidentified interviewee] "If you were to draw parallels, the comparison would not be in our favor. First, we cannot improve our weapons because the test ranges are closed and 'real-life' tests have stopped. For the same reason we cannot check on how safe our weapons are in storage. The Americans have reduced the number of their tests to a minimum because they can mathematically model the 'behavior' of weapons using computers, and are, incidentally, continuing to develop third-generation weapons that we can only dream of. We do

not have that possibility: the total capacity of our computer centers is several times smaller than the Americans', and our computers are not technically capable of coping with such work. As a result, operations that they can carry out in a day or two take us three months, with the machines working at full capacity and the experts working flat out, 10-15 hours a day.

"Also, there are still weapons in our arsenals that were produced in the fifties and sixties. Although they are imperfect and not very reliable, no one has ever considered destroying them."

[Belyaninov] "Do you think an accidental explosion is possible?"

[Unidentified interviewee] "Of course. There are now 300,000 homeless officers in the Army, and a man who is simply tired out because of the trials of daily life may easily make a mistake when carrying out routine inspection and maintenance work on nuclear weapons. As a result the detonator capsule will go off—and in the old models they are highly imperfect—and there will be a mighty explosion of the explosive material. That will not cause a chain reaction in the nuclear 'stuffing,' but pieces of radioactive materials will be scattered over a radius of tens of kilometers."

The former theories of "nuclear deterrence" and international balance, according to which the two nuclear superpowers—the USSR and the United States—counterbalanced each other, making the situation in the world comparatively stable, have by all appearances gone forever. Soviet defense systems, designed in response to the probable adversary's latest weapons, will become absolutely useless in five or six years, in view of the fact that no country in the world has yet stopped its weapons development program. And if you remember that plans for the development of a "nuclear bomb for the Arab world" have already been announced, a scenario that today seems somewhat ridiculous will become entirely possible: some future Saddam Husayn will dictate his terms to the present Commonwealth.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Commentary on Problems in CW Elimination

LD3101141292 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1510 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Commentary by military correspondent Mikhail Umanov—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The current session of the conference on disarmament continues drafting an international convention to ban chemical weapons [CW]. The problem of eliminating war gases is again in the focus of public attention. Commentary is by military correspondent Mikhail Umanov:

Our experts say that given a definite correction in the positions of the parties concerned, a convention may be signed by the end of the current year. This is at any rate more realistic than the beginning in the near future of the

elimination of our chemical arsenals, which have, by different estimates, from 40,000 to 50,000 tons of war gases. [sentence as heard]

The elimination must begin no later than on 31 December 1992, according to the agreement with the United States, which, though, has not yet been ratified by this country.

We're facing rather serious difficulties in this sphere; among them is the absence of specialized enterprises to destroy chemical weapons, no (?sites for their construction) and operation, shortage of ecologically reliable technologies and other problems, but the absence of a state policy and state decisions are the main problems.

The former Soviet Union has not managed either to adopt or, the more so, to begin to carry out the state-developed program to eliminate chemical weapons.

Today all chemical weapons are stored on the territory of Russia and, as one can judge, the Russian authorities are ever more concerned over them. Late last year all the aspects of the matter were discussed at the Russian parliament, and now a special committee has been created involving managers, chemists, military and other experts. This provides hope that our long-term and stable political orientation to the complete elimination of chemical weapons in the near future will begin to be implemented, obviously, with a definite share of participation offered by some republics. Western assistance would also be helpful.

The Russian foreign minister military adviser Geliy Batenin believes that such assistance could be expedient in the following directions.

[Batenin is heard briefly, fading into English translation] We need assistance in ensuring a better ecology. We didn't pay enough attention to this—the technical sponsoring of all our programs by the engineer and technical personnel and experts of the West, first of all the United States. We need money, hard currency, to buy some know-how elements, equipment, most likely in the United States, too. [sentence as heard] Maybe part of those \$400 million set aside by the United States for assistance in eliminating nuclear weapons would involve chemical weapons.

CW Commander Cited on Problems in Weapons Elimination

LD0302112292 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0955 GMT 3 Feb 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—“While carrying out the policy of banning and destroying chemical weapons [CW], the Russian Federation will inevitably meet with great problems which it has inherited from the former Union,” thinks Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, chief of the chemical forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces.

As far back as two years, he said in an interview today with ITAR-TASS, a draft of a state program for destroying chemical weapons was worked out. Yet, since then neither the USSR Supreme Soviet nor the USSR Cabinet of Ministers have adopted any concrete decisions on this.

The draft—which is under examination in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet—in Gen. Petrov's view, does not reflect the key element: the creation of a state commission that will be responsible for choosing the sites where chemical weapons will be destroyed and which will define variants of the procedure. The draft, on which governmental circles have not even begun working, is in need of other details and corrections.

“This relates in the first place to the time limits and schedules in the destruction of chemical weapons,” noted Gen. Petrov. “Of course, one should approach this bearing in mind the real capabilities that exist in Russia, which has taken on itself the responsibility of destroying all the chemical weapons of the former USSR”. The most logical, in his view, thing to do would be to sign an agreement at an intergovernmental level on the distribution of material and financial expenditures in connection with this.

The technologies for destroying chemical weapons are now being upgraded. The main aim is to achieve not only the waste free production cycle of the destruction process but also to produce goods for the national economy in order to cover the expenses, noted Stanislav Petrov.

Touching on the question of U.S. financial aid to Russia for destroying weapons of mass destruction, Gen. Petrov expressed the hope that a certain part of this money will go to the destruction of chemical arsenals.

BW 'Still Being Tested' in Aral Sea Area

LD0602203692 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English 1604 GMT 6 Feb 92

[From the “Military News” section: “Firing Ground Might Be Put Out of Operation in Kazakhstan”]

[Text] Alma-Ata—The Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan considered the firing ground on the Vozrozhdeniye Island inadmissible. A decree of the republican Supreme Soviet on urgent measures for basic improvements of the living standards in Priaralye (the Aral region) states that the operation of the firing ground should be investigated and the proposal of its closure should be submitted to the republican Supreme Soviet. The decree was adopted on January 18 and published by the republican mass media on February 5. The People's Deputy Mukhtar Shakh-anov told the republican Supreme Soviet session that the bacteriological weapons [BW] were still being tested at the firing ground.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

CIS Agreement on Nuclear Forces 'Reassuring'

*PM0602114992 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1910 GMT 28 Jan 92*

[Report from the "Information Bulletin" program

[Text] If the Commonwealth develops successfully, it will remember the first month of the new year for a long time to come. Military problems have seriously exacerbated the situation in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Only one thing is reassuring—the fact that its leaders have reached agreement on nuclear forces. It has been decided that they will be controlled by a unified command. With the formation of the CIS, the number of nuclear states has increased. Since the very birth of the Commonwealth, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belarus have taken a rather unclear stand on the issue of whether or not to have their own nuclear weapons. This prompted an immediate reaction in the West, which would naturally like nuclear weapons to remain in one pair of hands. Since the CIS has so far given rise to nothing but spontaneous conflicts, Western experts have started categorically talking about their preference for all nuclear weapons to be moved to Russia. Now Nursultan Nazarbayev has said that he values the international community's recognition more than entry into the nuclear club. The Ukraine is declaring its nonnuclear status, and the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from its territory is beginning. But worries still persist. The Army has found itself drawn into the presidential game of sovereignty. This has at times been so intense that it seems that everything we have previously achieved is on the point of collapse...

Tactical Nuclear Arms Withdrawing From Kiev District

*92UM0474B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA
in Russian 28 Jan 92 p 1*

[Interview with Colonel A. Koryakin, chief of staff of missile and artillery forces of the Kiev Military District, by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent V. Shvyrev; place and date not given: "Strictly According to Schedule—Tactical Nuclear Weapons Are Being Withdrawn From the Territory of the Kiev Military District"]

[Text] In keeping with the agreement among the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States signed in Minsk, the withdrawal has begun of tactical nuclear weapons, which are subsequently to be destroyed, from the territory of Ukraine, particularly from the bases of the Kiev Military District. This operation is being carried out by highly trained specialists with strict observance of safety measures. The first nuclear warheads from tactical missiles and nuclear artillery ammunition have already been sent to the designated point.

Our correspondent met with the chief of staff of the missile forces and artillery of the Kiev Military District,

A. Koryakin, and asked him to answer some questions pertaining to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the district.

[Shvyrev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, apparently there is no need to show how crucial and complicated the operation for withdrawing nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition is. A great deal has to be taken into account, thought about, and anticipated here. Therefore the first question is about what has been done on the plane of preparing people, technical equipment, and also the nuclear weapons themselves before they are transported.

[Koryakin] Undoubtedly the withdrawal of nuclear weapons is far from being a simple task. It requires, above all, that the specialists strictly observe security measures and that they take precise and coordinated actions in all stages of the performance of this task. Based on this, we have conducted an immense complex of measures whose main purpose was to check the readiness of the military servicemen for work with nuclear weapons and their ability to perform their duties without mistakes. As a result, the packing and shipping of the items was handled by people who, one might say, can almost read each other's minds. And, as the past days and weeks have shown, everyone who participated in sending the first consignment of nuclear warheads showed a high level of professional skill.

In parallel with the testing and training of personnel, we worked to put the nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition in a minimum state of readiness that would assure their safety during transportation. All the measures planned for this were also carried out well and by the established deadlines.

[Shvyrev] If it is not a secret, tell us what kind of transportation was used to transport the nuclear warheads.

[Koryakin] From the territory of the Kiev Military District they were shipped only by rail, and not a single one of our men was required to accompany them. This task is handled by others.

[Shvyrev] From the reports shown on Ukrainian Television, many of our readers thought the nuclear warheads were located right in the units and subdivisions for combat application. Is this really true?

[Koryakin] Of course not. Nuclear warheads of tactical missiles and nuclear artillery ammunition are located at storage bases where the necessary temperature, humidity, cleanliness, and many other factors have been created and are strictly maintained. Monitoring these things is the responsibility of specialists who, among other things, take care of servicing warheads and performing standard maintenance work on them.

And another thing, which is, as it were, a digression. Among people who have nothing to do with nuclear weapons there is the opinion that a person can have contact with them only if he is wearing special protective

clothing. Not at all. Nuclear charges are so safe in terms of health that our military servicemen work with them wearing ordinary lab coats.

[Shvyrev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, let us imagine the day when all nuclear weapons have been removed from the territory of the district. Then what will happen to the people, many of whom have been in the service and working at the bases for many years? Will they be discharged from the Army?

[Koryakin] That question is not being raised that way today. Although, of course, we cannot get by here without transfers, changes in the staff structure, and a partial reduction. At the same time, complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons still does not mean eliminating them instead of storing them. They will remain, since today they carry not only nuclear warheads, but there are also missiles which, as we know, are not to be destroyed. In the future they will be equipped with ordinary charges, which will also require constant attention from people. Therefore it would be at best unwise to relinquish the services of the people who are working on the bases now, the more so since it costs money to train these people. And a few more words should be said about the problem of further use of highly trained military personnel who have an excellent knowledge of their work.

[Shvyrev] So will the fate of the missile complexes that are now used to arm units and subdivisions for combat application turn out positive as well?

[Koryakin] Absolutely. Let me clarify one point. In the missile forces of the district, in addition to models of new technical equipment, there is equipment that has long outlived its day or, in other words, is obsolete. The use of the latter requires immense material expenditures on maintenance, repair, and operation. Therefore missile complexes that have been around for a long time will be written off.

[Shvyrev] And the last question. Anatoliy Ivanovich, are any difficulties or snags arising during the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the district and what is the deadline for completing this operation?

[Koryakin] Since the first days of the withdrawal of nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition all work has been conducted strictly according to schedule and without any complications. I personally see this as a result of the deep understanding and high degree of responsibility of the people in charge of this task, which is of historic significance. These words apply fully as well to the officers of the staff of missile forces and artillery of the district, Lieutenant Colonels V. Reznikov, V. Anufriyev, N. Khakimov, and many others.

[Shvyrev] Thank you for the interview and allow me on your behalf to assure the readers of NARODNAYA ARMIYA that throughout the entire withdrawal of the nuclear weapons, they will constantly be receiving information that interests them.

[Koryakin] We do not intend to keep any secrets regarding this from the newspaper's readers. We promise to inform them regularly about all the measures that are being taken, thanks to which we are taking the first steps toward a nonnuclear Ukraine.

Yeltsin ABC Interview Cited on Nuclear Command, Control

*LD0102090592 Moscow TASS in English
0756 GMT 1 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Sitov]

[Excerpt] New York February 1 ITAR-TASS—All nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are under the control of President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, the ABC network was told.

The ABC timed the broadcast of Yeltsin's interview, on Friday [31 January] night, for the Russian leader's visit to the United States. The interview had been recorded in the Kremlin on January 25.

Earlier, the ABC included an excerpt from the interview in one of its regular news programmes with an announcement that Russian strategic missiles would no longer be targeted on U.S. cities.

In answer to a question whether nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are under his command, Yeltsin said: "Yes. This is the only way. We have two buttons, one is under my control and the other one is under the control of Marshal Shaposhnikov. No other authority may manage or has technical control over nuclear weapons."

Then the president of the Russian Federation specified that the button controlled by the military commander cannot be pressed without the presidential one.

Yeltsin denied assertions by some media that some Russian nuclear specialists now work abroad, in Libya in particular. Referring to the results of his recent meeting with scientists, he added: "The government of the Russian Federation intends to show care for nuclear scientists. I think this will set people's minds at rest." [passage omitted]

Kazakh President: 'Yeltsin Speaks Not on Our Behalf'

*LD0602143292 Moscow TASS in English
1502 GMT 6 Feb 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Excerpt] Vienna February 6 TASS—In an interview published in the Austrian newspaper DIE PRESSE today, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan said his republic champions the abolition of all nuclear weapons on its territory and the termination of nuclear tests.

Asked to evaluate the recent meeting between U.S. and Russian Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin in Washington, Nazarbayev said "in the issue of nuclear

disarmament, Yeltsin speaks not on our behalf" and this should be clear to the West.

"None of the Commonwealth leaders knows on what foundation Yeltsin and Bush have reached an accord." In addition, Nazarbayev thinks what was discussed in Washington can be described only as "an initiative, which is far from a final agreement".

According to Nazarbayev, if one considers today's disarmament proposals, the U.S. has the significant advantage in relation to the other side: a three-to-one advantage, what we can not accept.

Nazarbayev believes there should be parity in nuclear warheads between the Commonwealth and the U.S. "We cannot agree to being put in the disadvantaged position". He stressed he would bring his point of view to Bush's knowledge during a meeting in Washington, which is scheduled to take place in the next few months, and also to the knowledge of Yeltsin.

Asked how to interpret the notions "common" and "independent" as applied to the Commonwealth, Nazarbayev answered that the strategic arsenal of the former Soviet Union is the common problem. However, each individual republic exercises control over conventional armed forces and can pursue its own policy. [passage omitted]

Tactical Nuclear Arms Withdrawal From Belarus Not Complete

LD0802083792 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Feb 92 p 1

[Report by Igor Sinyakevich: "Belarus: Tactical Nuclear Weapons Still Not Withdrawn From Republic. What About Statements by President Yeltsin and Belarus Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko?"]

[Text] The mass media have circulated a statement by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the effect that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Kazakhstan and Belarus to Russia was completed 1 February.

Republic Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko said the same thing (about Belarus) when speaking in Prague at a session of the Council of CSCE Foreign Ministers.

The Belarussian Military District press center refused to confirm or deny this report.

In order to clear up the situation NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent turned to high-ranking officials in the Belarus Defense Ministry, the parliamentary Commission for Defense Questions, and to the Belarussian Military District Staff. The answers given by all three representatives, who wished to remain anonymous, boiled down to the following: The report that the process of withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus territory had been completed by 1 February does not accord with the real situation.

AUSTRIA

Vranitzky Suggests West Buy CIS Weapons

AU0402173092 Vienna ORF Teletext in German
1627 GMT 4 Feb 92

[Text] Following a cabinet meeting today, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky suggested that the West should buy weapons from the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and should then deactivate or destroy them. He said that in this way, the pressure on other countries to step up armament would then decrease, and the CIS would have more money for investments. Vranitzky views this as a sort of "peace dividend."

Vranitzky added that it was important that Western and not Arab countries buy the weapons. Austria would, however, not be eligible as a buyer but would be prepared to offer assistance.

FPOe [Freedom Party of Austria] Chairman Joerg Haider said that Vranitzky was apparently not aware that he was calling for international arms deals. OeVP [Austrian People's Party] Secretary General Korosec spoke about a "strange idea."

FRANCE

European Defense Identity, Doctrine Discussed

92P20127A Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS
in French 11-12 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Alain Chastagnol: "Mitterrand Ready to Share the Deterrent"]

[Text] Mitterrand is logical. He spared no effort to advance the political and military union of Europe at Maastricht. It is natural for him to warn the EC today that "one of the major questions" is the possibility of instituting "a European defense doctrine." "The debate on the defense of Europe," he explains, poses unresolved problems that must be resolved and notably that of nuclear arms."

We already hear the protests of all who consider nuclear arms to be essentially tied to the national sanctuary. Are we going to press the button of the French strike force [force de frappe] if the Russian tanks cross the Elbe? Can the French nuclear umbrella become the European umbrella, as Mr. Delors just reaffirmed? Recently in that very same newspaper, General Gallois stressed all that separated Germany from France and the impossibility of considering Europe as a new military sanctuary, dispatching those who think otherwise to sidewalk-cafe discussions.

In truth, the security of Europe and the nuclear problem do not present themselves in such cartoon-like terms. If there are differences between Germany and France and between other EC members, there are increasingly numerous areas of agreement. The wish to create a European defense identity was affirmed at Maastricht because all felt strongly that they had embarked upon the same causes—to face up to the Gulf crisis, to the

upheavals in the East, to the conflicts of central Europe.... All felt that the United States, always willing to resort to isolationism, could not come to settle our problems forever and that it was indispensable to establish a European pillar of NATO on the basis of the WEU.

Yes, a European rapid action force makes sense on the basis of a French-German army corps. The French are in any case more at ease with it than with the rapid intervention force desired by NATO under an Atlantic command. A European rapid action force—a European army corps—will need missiles with nuclear warheads. All the more so since the threats emanating from nuclear powers henceforth risk becoming more numerous.

That does not take away the freedom of France to decide about its own strike force—not now, not even later. However, one can understand that solutions should be sought by the two nuclear powers of today, France and Great Britain, and that European security should be rethought in this manner and explained to the Europe of the Twelve, particularly if the success of the American Strategic Defense Initiative led to the rapid envisioning of a European space shield. France would be incontestably its first project manager.

However, nothing exists yet. Mr. Mitterrand's logical argument demonstrates just as logically that nothing was concluded at Maastricht in the field of defense. There is a flagrant distortion between the keen awareness of Kohl and Mitterrand of the need to make their foreign and military policies converge with reality. The German chancellor seems to very quickly forget his European resolutions and decides right after the summits to do the opposite of what he promised. Moreover, on matters of defense the only decision made to date was on creating a French-German army corps.

Mr. Mitterrand's wish would truly be more credible if, beyond the army corps, a rapid action force had already been constituted or if, at the very least the desire to harmonize material had been apparent. However, the lofty intentions expressed at Maastricht are far from being a reality. When one notes that France's military funds for an army that is supposed to be our great European trump card are diminishing, when one notes that budgetary restrictions are going to create 12,000 unemployed in the weapons sector, it is time to ask whether verbal incantation is not pushed a little too far, and whether the right hand will ignore for long what the left hand is doing.

Mitterrand, Yeltsin Discuss Nuclear Disarmament

AU0502203492 Paris AFP in English 1959 GMT
5 Feb 92

[Pierre Favier report]

[Excerpt] Paris, Feb 5 (AFP) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin and French counterpart Francois Mitterrand discussed nuclear disarmament during their first official talks here Wednesday [5 February] evening. The two men spent 90 minutes in talks devoted mainly to nuclear matters, in the wake of last week's proposals by Yeltsin

and U.S. President George Bush for deep cuts in strategic arsenals, said Pierre Morel, diplomatic aide to Mitterrand.

Prior to leaving Moscow, Yeltsin had told journalists he hoped to reach agreement on a reduction in France's nuclear arsenal. "I am convinced that France's defence expenditure will ... be reduced," he said.

France, like Britain, has so far rejected any reduction in its nuclear weapons until the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) further reduce their arsenals.

The talks, at the start of Yeltsin's three-day state visit, showed "a great convergence on the idea of a sufficient defence and minimum deterrence," Morel said.

Mitterrand stressed that the end of the Cold War era had brought about a "fundamental change of perspective for the whole of Europe," adding that he was concerned about possible local conflicts of the Yugoslav type.

Yeltsin, who controls the nuclear trigger in the CIS, briefed Mitterrand on how the system now operated, with joint consultations between all four of the CIS nuclear republics.

On the problem of tactical nuclear weapons, Yeltsin said all of these had already been withdrawn from Kazakhstan and would be repatriated to Russia from the Ukraine and Belarus before the summer. On strategic weapons, he acknowledged that a timetable had not yet been agreed upon between all the republics, but suggested that missiles in Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and Belarus would be brought back to Russia or destroyed within two years.

Difficulties might arise though as Kazakhstan has indicated it intends to retain its strategic missiles for the foreseeable future, observers said.

The Russian president, who is locked in a dispute with the Ukraine over control of the Black Sea Fleet, also spoke of the "very serious danger" that would arise from dividing up conventional forces between different CIS members.

Yeltsin also stressed the importance of Western aid in helping Russia overcome its economic difficulties, adding that "the end of the winter will be crucial" for Russian people who face severe shortages. [passage omitted]

GERMANY

Defense Minister on New Bundeswehr Missions, Policy

92GE0202A Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND
TECHNIK in German No 1, Jan 92 pp 9-12

[Article by Minister of Defense Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg: "Perspectives of Security and Future Missions of the Bundeswehr"]

[Text] During the years 1989 and 1990, we experienced and helped shape an unprecedented historical transformation in Germany and Europe. It brought about the surmounting of the partition of our continent and our fatherland as a result of the collapse of the communist dictatorships, and a decrease in the military confrontation in Central Europe. But anyone who thought that harmony would now take over in the world and that security-political developments would now run a smooth course was suffering under an illusion. Since the beginning of 1991, we have been experiencing new tensions and conflicts inside and outside our continent. Sooner than expected, developments ranging from the civil war in Yugoslavia to the internal convulsions in the former Soviet Union have clearly demonstrated the instabilities and dangers that must be reckoned with in Europe, even after the political and military confrontation has been overcome.

The signing of the START treaty and the initiative of President Bush in September 1991 will lead to further drastic reductions in the nuclear potentials of the United States and the Soviet Union. The long-standing demand of the Federal Republic, viz. that all land-based short-range tactical nuclear weapons be destroyed, is now becoming reality. The strength of the armed forces can be substantially reduced. Our defense alliance is redefining its missions.

At the latest NATO summit in Rome, the New Strategic Concept of the alliance was adopted, and at the inter-governmental conference in Maastricht, finally, a big step was taken toward the completion of the economic and monetary union and the political union with a common foreign and security policy.

Our world continues to be characterized by many conflicts and tensions. The Gulf war in the first few months of this year was an event of far-reaching significance for international politics. Once more, the background and course of this war made it clear that the preservation of peace in freedom is indissolubly linked to the enforcement of international law. This will remain one of the most important missions of the international community. The historical lesson, viz. that military force is also required in the enforcement of international law when all other means have been exhausted, was confirmed. Threats and the use of aggressive force can only be contained and repelled by counterforce. The notion of peace without power is a dangerous illusion. Security systems without appropriate means of military power are pointless.

A new experience was the close cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It made it possible for the United Nations to achieve an unprecedented level of unity and capability for action during this international conflict. The future effectiveness of the world organization will depend to a decisive degree on the willingness of as many states as possible to take part in sanctions of the international community, including military measures. Here there are, understandably, expectations that the international community has of us.

It is essential, for that reason, to establish clear constitutional prerequisites as soon as possible for Bundeswehr operations undertaken in response to United Nations resolutions.

However, the Gulf conflict also made it clear to us that peace in Europe does not automatically also mean peace for Europe. The increasing international integration of states, as well as the continuing spread of modern weapons technology, reduces the spatial distances in crises and conflicts as well. The coalescing Europe of democratic states will for that reason have to pay more attention to challenges and risks arising outside of Europe. In addition, however, it must also not overlook the risks which could result within Europe from instabilities, both economic and social, and from ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes.

We are following, with concern, the difficult process of economic, social, and political revival in the young democracies in eastern Europe. Helping them in this endeavor is a contribution of inestimable value to stability and security in Europe. The security interests of these states are national in nature and at the same time have a European orientation. Here we have begun, within the alliance, to develop forms of multinational cooperation with them in all areas of security. We have begun bilateral cooperation with all armies of the eastern states, including the Soviet Union.

Europe is currently going through a turbulent transition period, the duration and course of which cannot be foreseen. With the reorientation of its politics, the Soviet Union has made a substantial contribution toward overcoming the East-West antagonism and the partition of Europe and Germany. However, the failed coup attempt of August 1991 demonstrated dramatically how unstable the relationship was between the reform forces and the hard-line communist forces.

With the victory of the reform forces and the banning of the communist party, an era lasting more than 70 years has ended. The Soviet Union as a centrally governed state has in effect ceased to exist. Whether long-lasting stable and reliable structures can be established on the groundwork of the crumbling giant state, structures which also give guarantees for a control of conventional and nuclear potentials, continues to be one of the key questions for the near future.

Nevertheless, the imponderables and risks of the current development should not obstruct our view of the advances and accomplishments made in recent years, which we wish to preserve and expand cooperatively. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, our geostrategic situation has improved decisively. Today, Germany no longer finds herself in the extremely exposed position of a "front-line state." For the first time, we have democratic states along our eastern borders. Their armed forces do not pose a threat for us. Considering the history of the last 40 years, that is an extraordinarily positive observation.

New Strategic Concept of NATO

In view of the diverse and ever closer interrelationship of the world's states to each other, security politics today must in a broad sense go beyond military strategy and armed forces and encompass all fields of action of politics. That was one of the central ideas by which the Atlantic Alliance was guided in formulating its New Strategic Concept, the product of its fundamental examination of its strategy to date.

The NATO of the future will have four primary security-political functions:

1. It is the indispensable basis for a stable security-political environment in Europe, in which no state can intimidate another, subject it to force, or gain control over it through threats or the use of force.
2. It is the Transatlantic forum for consultations among the allies concerning their vital interests, including possible risks for the security of alliance members.
3. It serves as a deterrent to all threats of aggression and repels all attacks on the sovereign territory of a NATO member state, and it preserves the strategic balance in Europe.
4. Also in the future, NATO will have at its disposal the political and military capabilities and resources needed to deal with crises, to prevent war, and for an effective military defense.

Needed, therefore, are a dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability.

Of the principles of the new alliance strategy, let me mention just the most important ones:

NATO will continue to be defensive. The security of all alliance partners is indivisible. The presence of clearly reduced American conventional and nuclear armed forces in Europe remains vital.

In the course of developing a European security identity, the European NATO partners will assume a greater responsibility for the defense of Europe.

The principle of collective defense finds expression in joint armed forces planning, joint operational planning, multinational formations, the stationing of armed forces outside their own national territory, on a reciprocal basis if need be, as well as in precautions taken for crisis management and strengthening the armed forces during periods of crisis.

The following basic principles will apply in the future with respect to the assigned strength and missions of the alliance: The overall strength of NATO armed forces and the readiness level of many major formations will be reduced.

A comprehensive, highly manned, and linear defense structure in the central region, a characteristic of the former forward defense, is no longer necessary.

The geographic distribution of the armed forces in peacetime will ensure that there is an adequate military presence throughout the territory of the entire alliance.

The armed forces of the alliance must be more flexible and more mobile, and they must have an assured capability for a buildup if needed.

The conventional armed forces will comprise formations for immediate and rapid response, primary defense units, and reinforcement units.

NATO's New Strategic Concept makes it possible to maintain security at the lowest possible force level. With this concept, NATO makes a decisive contribution to the advancement of a lasting peace order in Europe.

In addition to NATO and the European Community, the CSCE will need to be further expanded as a forum of all-European cooperation with the participation of the United States. NATO and the CSCE are to complement one another. They can also work more closely together in a security-political sense, in the areas of confidence-building and verification, as well as the settlement and prevention of conflicts, for example. The CSCE cannot replace NATO, however.

The latest German-French initiative for the formation of a European corps underscores the goal of strengthening the European security identity. This multinational formation is to be available for assignment to both NATO and the Western European Union [WEU], depending on the concrete situation.

Germany and the Bundeswehr

Within this newly delimited security-political framework, Germany will, also in the future, make a significant contribution to mutual defense. As an army within the alliance, the Bundeswehr, together with the armed forces of the allies, continues to have the political mission of guaranteeing the security and defense of our country and the territory of the alliance, and in this way contributing to the preservation of political capability for action.

Universal military service will be retained for national political, social, and military reasons.

With a manning strength of 370,000 soldiers, our armed forces, notwithstanding the low probability of a major military conflict, will have three primary missions:

1. First, our armed forces are part of an all-European balance of military potentials. In this capacity, they are contributing to the predictability and stability of European security structures.
2. Second, they must have the capability and the readiness for defense, for the direct protection of the territorial integrity of Germany and her allies.
3. Finally, formations of the Bundeswehr—following the creation of the constitutional prerequisites—are also to be available for collective operations outside the territory of the alliance and take part in international peace-keeping and conflict resolution missions.

After the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] goes into effect, the Bundeswehr will take part in monitoring compliance with that treaty's provisions. With the establishment of a center for verification tasks and the

training of specialized personnel for these tasks, we have at an early date created all the prerequisites for unreservedly meeting the requirements of this and other future tasks.

In addition to its primary military mission, the Bundeswehr is especially qualified, by dint of its equipment, organization, and command and control resources, to render assistance during catastrophes, during humanitarian aid operations abroad, or in monitoring environmental protection. Our soldiers saved many people's lives under the most difficult of conditions while aiding Kurdish refugees in Turkey, in Iraq, as well as in Iran. For this effort, which came close to reaching the limit of their capacity, they deserve our thanks and our recognition, as do the crews of our minesweepers utilized in the Persian Gulf.

As in the past and at present, the Bundeswehr will also in the future do its part when it is asked to render aid or support. These are additional missions, however; they supplement the mission of guaranteeing the peace and serving as a precautionary security measure, but they cannot replace it.

In the proposed target structure, the mission accomplishment of the armed forces in the future, operating with a reduced strength of 370,000 troops, will above all have to meet three requirements:

1. It must assure the training of conscripts performing their basic military service and the capability to establish the operational readiness of personnel and materiel within appropriate time periods. For this purpose, we will continue to need units which for the most part will be fully manned already in peacetime.
2. It must ensure an augmentation capability by additional units after an extended warning and preparation period. These will be cadre-strength or partially cadre-strength units.
3. It must have the capability, in the event of regional conflicts in Europe, to serve as the German contribution to multinational missions.

For the last-named area, we are striving for a structure with selected mobile deployment formations, manned by career soldiers, extended-service personnel, and conscripts serving in them voluntarily.

To fulfill these requirements effectively, extensive structural reforms are needed in all of the military services, the central military units, and the military administration, reforms which will permit a saving of manpower also in the headquarters units. At the heart of the Bundeswehr reform is the organizational consolidation of field and territorial army in peacetime, a measure which will have significant streamlining effects.

The command structures of the other military services and organizational areas will also be streamlined. The Luftwaffe will reduce its authorized personnel slots at command agencies by 25 percent and will convert circa 30 percent of its flying units as well as the surface-to-air

missile units to partially cadre-strength units. The Navy will reduce the number of its ships and the naval air forces.

The establishment of the manning strength of the all-German armed forces at 370,000 soldiers has led since the summer of 1990 not only to completely new planning for the armed forces in the old Federal Republic; it was also necessary to incorporate in this planning the responsibility for personnel, materiel, and infrastructure of the National People's Army [NVA] that was being deactivated, and then planning anew structures and garrisons for all-German armed forces in the unified Germany. Despite an overall positive survey of what has been accomplished and achieved, much remains to be done, in view of the tangibles and intangibles left behind by the government of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED].

This includes above all the still not resolved task of financially securing the sizable additional investments needed in the new laender, so as to be able to offer the soldiers there the same living conditions, for example, that have been taken for granted in the West for years already.

I emphasize this in order to give you an idea of the planning and organizational dimension that we have overcome and which is now to take shape. Just the completion of the stationing plan and the preparation of the ministry concept in the summer of this year made the greatest of demands on all those involved, in the command staffs, but also in the regional command agencies. Once again, I want to thank and express my appreciation to all those who had a hand in this.

The military mission accomplishment of the Bundeswehr must continue to be guaranteed. This also includes the necessary exercise and training possibilities at or near the garrison. The readjustment is to lead to economical solutions that are financially appropriate considering the scarcity of resources.

Our reform concept for the reorganization of the military administration and the administration in the armament sector was presented at the end of September. Following the analysis of various opinions, it was conclusively decided upon in December.

With our attempts at conceptual and structural reforms, we are conforming to the security-political and strategic changes and thus to the requirements and tasks of the future. What the Bundeswehr and our civil administration need now, above all, are planning certainty and reliable planning guidelines, also in order to make the changeover predictable and tolerable for the soldiers and civilian employees. In all, more than 600,000 people with their families are directly or indirectly affected. Reassignments to a hitherto unknown degree will result from the reorganization. The Bundeswehr reform will without a doubt create adjustment problems for many of those affected. It must not lead to social rejections, however. Once the decisions have also been made in the civilian sector, it will be necessary for personnel agencies

and supervisors to be able to inform all persons directly affected about their new duties as soon as possible.

During the coming years, the Personnel Strength Law is to expedite the early release of approximately 7,000 older career soldiers, who in the future cannot be given suitable duty assignments in the new personnel structure.

Parallel thereto, civil servants, salaried employees, and workers are to be given the opportunity, for a limited period, subject to the approval of their employer, of retiring from their positions upon reaching age 55. This is aimed particularly at those employees working at garrisons which are to be closed or greatly reduced in size.

At the same time, the two laws and accompanying decisions contain provisions for civil servants who still have a number of years to go before reaching regular retirement age to be given other duties in the Federal administration area if at all possible. There will also be similar offers for soldiers affected by early releases—except that, in this case, for status-related legal reasons, this will be done on a voluntary basis. For salaried employees and workers, appropriate collective bargaining arrangements are to be agreed upon. Negotiations on this and other peripheral steps are in full swing.

During this time of radical change, our Bundeswehr and our military administration need a strong vote of political support. We are obligated to help the soldiers and civilian employees affected, and to carry out the transformation in such a way that we will continue to have an efficient and motivated Bundeswehr.

This also includes a better personnel structure for officers and noncommissioned officers. This is urgently needed both because of their more demanding duty requirements and in order to assure an adequate pool of replacements in the future. We have now reached a consensus for such a new concept within the Federal government and also hope to be able to get the necessary majority approval of the Bundestag very soon.

The reform project facing us constitutes the greatest planning and organizational challenge since the buildup of the Bundeswehr. The required reduction and reform of the Bundeswehr can succeed only if it is solidly supported, and the responsibility shared, by all politically and socially accountable forces.

The will and capability for a credible defense are indispensable prerequisites for our independence, security, and our capability to enter into alliances. The vast majority of our citizens are relying on this will and on this capability of their armed forces. Also in the future, we will make our contribution to this with a smaller and efficient Bundeswehr, with modern equipment. To work toward this objective in what is now a unified Germany, in a Europe that is evolving more and more under the banner of freedom and democracy—this is a magnificent, a rewarding task, worthy of our complete personal commitment. In the future, as in the past, the Christian

Democratic Union [CDU] stands firmly at the side of our Bundeswehr, its soldiers and civilian employees, and I ask you all for your support and help in overcoming the tasks that lie ahead.

Kohl Favors Linking CIS Aid to Arms Control

*LD0602132492 Hamburg DPA in German 1252 GMT
6 Feb 92*

[Text] Duesseldorf (DPA)—Chancellor Helmut Kohl has come out in favor of linking aid to the CIS states to stringent control over nuclear and chemical weapons. The states really have to disarm and strictly observe treaties, Kohl said in an interview in the Duesseldorf *HANDELSBLATT* (Friday edition).

Kohl made an urgent call for support for the reform states in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, and the CIS republics. The more Western states that support the successor states of the Soviet Union, the easier it will be for them to overcome their problems. "It would not be a wise policy to not help the successor republics," said Kohl. Germany has made 105 billion German marks available to the Eastern European countries, and has reached the limit of its financial possibilities. "Now others in Europe, and also in quite far-off countries, must contribute as well." In this connection, he expressly appealed to Japan to help Eastern Europe.

SWEDEN

Prime Minister Seeks Role in 'Global Defenses in Space'

*PM0502145892 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 4 Feb 92 p 6*

[Sune Olofson report: "Sweden Should Take Part in Global Defenses in Space"]

[Text] Lycksele—It is Prime Minister Carl Bildt's view that if the United States and Russia build a global space-based defense system to protect against nuclear arms, Sweden must be involved in building and using the system.

Carl Bildt made this surprising announcement yesterday during the national "People and Defense" conference currently taking place in Lycksele.

"I think that we should be involved in attempting it. In the future, we must continue to have a system for dealing with the nuclear threat," Carl Bildt said at the press conference after his address.

In his address, Carl Bildt pointed to the risk of uncontrolled nuclear arms proliferation now that the Soviet Union has collapsed and also to how important it is to try to find an international control system. "Nuclear weapons have been invented, but they are more difficult to phase out," Carl Bildt said.

He made specific reference to Saddam Husayn's determined attempts to create a nuclear capacity of his own and to what could have happened if, instead of the invasion of Kuwait, he had had the option of using nuclear arms.

Carl Bildt continued:

"It is against this background that we must view the interest in making use of the technology developed in the U.S. SDI project to create a global system of defenses against limited attacks of the sort a massively armed country such as Iraq could be expected to launch."

In early 1983, Reagan launched his Star Wars program, which was to cost billions of dollars and end the threat from the East forever. Reagan's initiative also reflected his hopes of being able to bring his adversary to his knees through an arms program. In brief, the idea was to build a high tech shield in space which would ensure that hostile nuclear missiles would never be able to reach U.S. territory.

In a television speech at the end of January, Russian President Boris Yeltsin took up the issue and said that if such a system becomes a reality, Russia wants to be involved in order to achieve common security with the United States and consequently improve international stability.

In his address in Lycksele, Carl Bildt said:

"If such a system is to be built, it seems natural to ask that it should protect not only the United States and Russia, but have a global character and also offer effective protection to Western Europe, for example. Thus, there could be a possibility of the involvement of other nations in its construction and use.

"The system could hardly be limited to specific regions. It would probably also embrace us. There is every reason to make use of the comprehensive research there is in the United States, not forgetting Russia."

[Olofson] Where will the hostile missiles come from?

[Bildt] Saddam Husayn, to give a concrete example. There are a number of nations which have tried to acquire this type of technology. The good Mr. al-Qadhafi has a notorious establishment down in the desert which there is every reason to look at more closely.

[Olofson] Do you think that it is realistic to invest in this sort of incredibly expensive system when both the United States and Russia are disarming as much as they can? Are we to make a sudden turnabout?

[Bildt] Ask Yeltsin. There is tremendous technological and scientific competence in the otherwise so rundown Russia.

[Olofson] Who will pay for the system?

[Bildt] Those who use it. Our scope for being involved and paying for the system is limited, but this cannot be ruled out. Before the Cold War, there was a plan to put nuclear arms under UN control. Why should it not be possible in the new changed situation to put strategic

defense systems under the control of some sort of international authority.

[Olofson] When could the new system be in place?

[Bildt] Ten to fifteen years in the future.

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

2

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.